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STICKING POINTS: EPISTEMIC PLURALISM IN LEGAL
CHALLENGES TO MANDATORY VACCINATION POLICIES
James R. Steiner-Dillon*

ABSTRACT
“Everyone is entitled to his own opinion,” so the saying goes, “but not
to his own facts.” Yet contemporary society is marked by a remarkable
divergence of belief concerning matters of “objective” fact. This Article
explores the phenomenon of “epistemic pluralism”—entrenched
disagreement about matters of empirical fact—from the perspective of
John Rawls’s work on political liberalism. Expanding on Rawls’s
discussion of reasonable pluralism among normative viewpoints, it
argues that the persistence of epistemic pluralism poses challenges to the
legitimacy of coercive state action analogous to the challenges that Rawls
identified as arising from normative pluralism.
The Article examines legal challenges to mandatory vaccination
policies as a principal case study of epistemic pluralism in the law. For
over two hundred years, antivaccinationists have rejected the mainstream
medical consensus that vaccines are safe and effective and have opposed
immunization mandates on both empirical and normative grounds. This
Article develops a principle of “epistemic public reason,” which
incorporates a principle of epistemic reasonableness by which to
distinguish those epistemic viewpoints entitled to moral duties of civility
and reciprocity by fellow citizens. Finding that most empirical objections
to vaccination mandates are either directly or indirectly epistemically
unreasonable, the Article concludes that the coercive imposition of
immunization requirements on epistemic outliers is consistent with the
principle of epistemic public reason. It also clarifies more generally the
nature and extent of public officials’ obligation to offer reasons on
contested empirical questions relevant to public policy that all reasonable
citizens, including dissenters, can reasonably accept.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. I am deeply indebted to many who
have provided useful feedback on drafts of this Article, including: Kathy Abrams, Yavar Bathaee, Faisal
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Dorit Rubenstein Reiss, Andrea Roth, Sarah Song, Ryan Copus, Luke Haqq, Jeff Gordon, Chris Roederer,
Elisabeth Ryan, Jeff Schmitt, Matthew Shapiro, Blake Watson, and attendees of the Columbia Law School
Associates and Fellows Workshop. I am also grateful to Thomas Nagel, with whom my discussions of
Rawls while completing my M.A. in Philosophy germinated many of the ideas expressed herein.
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There is . . . no more truth, there is just what’s trending on Twitter.1
I. INTRODUCTION
“Everyone is entitled to his own opinion,” so the saying goes, “but not
to his own facts.”2 Yet contemporary society is marked by a remarkable
divergence of belief concerning matters of “objective” fact. Many policy
debates are characterized by disagreement not only about questions of
normative value, but also about issues of empirical fact that seem to defy
resolution.3 Significant disagreement persists regarding the extent to
which anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions contribute to climate
change,4 the ability of fetuses to feel pain when undergoing abortion,5 and
the safety of genetically modified organisms for human consumption and
for the environment, to name a few examples.6 Even the existence of a
stable consensus of expert opinion is often insufficient to establish social
consensus. Disagreement persists, viewpoints become entrenched, and
adherence to a particular empirical belief becomes as central to a person’s
identity as their religious or political affiliation.
This proliferation of disagreement on matters of empirical fact, which

1. Ed Pilkington, Trapped in a Hoax: Survivors of Conspiracy Theories Speak Out, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 24, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/23/ conspiracy-theoriesinternet-survivors-truth (quoting Lenny Pozner). Mr. Pozner’s six-year-old son, Noah, was killed in the
2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, CT. Mr. Ponzer subsequently became
a target of conspiracy theorists who maintain that the shooting never occurred, and that Noah Pozner never
existed. Id.
2. See George F. Will, The Wisdom of Pat Moynihan, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/01/AR2010100105262.html
(attributing the statement to Sen. Moynihan).
3. See Dan M. Kahan, Why Smart People Are Vulnerable to Putting Tribe Before Truth,
SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN
BLOG
NETWORK
(DEC.
3,
2018),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/why-smart-people-are-vulnerable-to-putting-tribebefore-truth.
4. Compare e.g., U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN
UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT 7 (2014),
THE
https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1412/ML14129A233.pdf (stating that the scientific evidence “tells an
unambiguous story: the planet is warming, and over the last half century, this warming has been driven
primarily by human activity”), and INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE
2007:
SYNTHESIS
REPORT
37
(2007),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr.pdf (stating that “[t] here is very high confidence
that the global average net effect of human activities since 1750 has been one of warming.”), with
S T.
J.,
Nov.
28,
2009,
Editorial,
Rigging
a
Climate
“Consensus,”
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703499404574559630382048494
(“The
impression left by the [the release of emails among climate scientists] is that the climate-tracking game
has been rigged from the start.”).
5. Pam Belluck, Complex Science at Issue in Politics of Fetal Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/health/complex-science-at-issue-in-politics-of-fetal-pain.html.
6. See, e.g., David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and
Democracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 81 (2005).
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I will refer to as “epistemic pluralism,” is not a transitory or contingent
phase of social development, but is an intrinsic feature of a liberal political
culture characterized by freedom of conscience and the operation of free
institutions. Drawing upon John Rawls’s work on political liberalism,7
this Article contends that epistemic pluralism is endemic to the liberal
state and raises many of the same questions concerning the legitimacy of
coercive state action. Rawls argues that the moral legitimacy of
democratically enacted policy is undermined when the coercive apparatus
of the state is used to impose upon an individual an obligation grounded
in a normative viewpoint that she cannot reasonably accept. Does the
same threat to legitimacy arise when the dissenter’s objection rests not on
a normative viewpoint but rather on a disputed empirical claim? If so,
how might legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies, all of which
are routinely called upon to make decisions privileging some empirical
propositions over others, make policy in a way that respects the moral
duties of reciprocity and civility owed by members of a liberal democratic
society to other members of the political community? This Article
addresses two questions unresolved by the existing literature: first, the
extent to which the problem of legitimacy of state coercion in a liberal
society extends to pluralism on the epistemic as well as the normative
axis; second, the extent to which Rawls’s solution to the problem in the
normative context can be adapted to the problem of epistemic pluralism.
This Article examines epistemic pluralism in one of the many areas in
which it has given rise to entrenched disagreement: legal challenges to
mandatory vaccination requirements. Although a stable consensus of
medical experts has held for over two centuries that vaccinations are one
of the most cost-effective interventions for the protection of public
health,8 antivaccinationists have rejected this consensus and denied the
effectiveness or safety of vaccinations since the earliest mass
immunization programs were implemented in the nineteenth century.
This disagreement of fact poses a challenge both for policymakers
attempting to devise rational and effective public health policies and for
courts called upon to resolve conflicts between individuals’ objections to
compulsory immunization and the state’s interest in implementing
evidence-based public health policies for the benefit of the community.
7. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (arguing that pluralism of normative belief
is an inevitable feature of a liberal society and examining the implications of that pluralism for the
legitimacy of state policymaking in a liberal democratic society).
8. See, e.g., Sandra J. Bean, Emerging and Continuing Trends in Vaccine Opposition Website
Content, 29 VACCINE 1874, 1874 (2011); Anna Kata, A Postmodern Pandora’s Box: Anti-Vaccination
Misinformation On The Internet, 28 VACCINE 1709, 1709 (2010) (noting that “morbidity and mortality
from vaccine-preventable diseases [] hav[e] reached record lows”); Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended
for Children – United States, 1990-1998, 48 MORB. MORTAL. WKLY. REP. 243 (1999).
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Persistent disagreement about the basic facts of vaccination risk raises a
challenging question: when, and under what circumstances, may the state
coercively impose policies that are grounded in an epistemic viewpoint
that accepts vaccination as a relatively safe and effective method of
disease prevention on individuals who reject that viewpoint?
If the phenomenon of epistemic pluralism is analogous to the problem
of normative pluralism that Rawls discusses, then we might expect to
address it by adapting Rawls’s principle of public reason to the epistemic
context. Under such a principle, public decisions would be grounded in
reasons that may be accepted by all citizens adhering to any “reasonable”
epistemic viewpoint, where the bounds of epistemic reasonableness are
defined by an overlapping consensus of reasonable epistemic
methodologies.9 This approach would be analogous to Rawls’s solution
to the problem of normative pluralism, which distinguishes
comprehensive views grounded in the overlapping consensus of
reasonable normative viewpoints from those outside that consensus,10 and
would distinguish the types of empirical views to which others owe duties
of reciprocity and civility from those “unreasonable” viewpoints to which
no such duties are owed. It would also clarify the nature of the state’s
obligation to reasonable dissenters—those whose methods of empirical
knowledge construction share in the overlapping consensus of reasonable
epistemic viewpoints, but who disagree with the majority’s empirical
conclusions in a particular instance.
This Article develops a principle of epistemic public reason that
articulates, on a constructivist basis analogous to Rawls’s principle of
normative public reason, a criterion of reasonableness that distinguishes
epistemic viewpoints that comprise the overlapping consensus of
reasonable epistemic views from those that fall outside it. It contends that,
at least with respect to the set of knowledge claims characterized as
“scientific,”11 epistemic viewpoints are reasonable insofar as they
recognize the primacy of an inductive mode of knowledge construction
via the method of scientific empiricism that lies at the heart of the modern
liberal consensus. Although articulating a specific “scientific method” has
proven a notoriously tricky task for scientists and philosophers of science,
it is unnecessary to do so with great precision for the purposes of this
Article; the concept of “reasonableness” is a capacious one. We need only

9. It is important to note that the overlapping consensus of both normative and epistemic
viewpoints is comprised of methodologies, not substantive views. Comprehensive viewpoints, as the name
implies, are moral theories—methods by which adherents arrive at answers to specific moral questions.
As discussed below, the content of the epistemic overlapping consensus is likewise comprised of empirical
methodologies. See infra Part III.
10. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 15.
11. See infra Part III (defining “scientific” questions).
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recognize that an epistemic viewpoint can violate the principle of
epistemic reasonableness in two ways: first, by a direct rejection of
scientific empiricism’s privileged epistemic status in the construction of
empirical knowledge; second, by professing an empirical position that
conforms to the form of the scientific empiricist mode of knowledge
construction, but rejects the body of empirical knowledge that has accrued
from the application of that method. In both these circumstances—nonscientific and pseudoscientific unreasonableness—the democratic
majority is free to enact policies backed by the coercive force of law upon
empirical premises grounded in scientific empiricism without regard to
the unreasonable dissent of epistemic outliers.
Applying the principle of epistemic public reason to challenges to
mandatory vaccination policies, this Article finds that most empirical
antivaccinationist arguments are epistemically unreasonable in either the
non-scientific or the pseudoscientific sense. Of the remainder—the
relatively small number of antivaccinationist views that accept the
epistemic primacy of scientific empiricism and the settled body of
knowledge concerning the safety and efficacy of vaccination constructed
by that method—the principle of epistemic public reason requires only
that the state give reasons that such dissenters could recognize as
legitimate. By definition, such dissenters recognize reasons grounded in
the application of scientific empiricism as legitimate, even if they disagree
with the majority’s empirical conclusions concerning vaccination. Thus,
the principle of epistemic public reason simultaneously clarifies the moral
obligations owed by citizens in a liberal democracy to one another when
disagreements about questions of empirical fact and methodology arise,
articulates a criterion of reasonableness by which to distinguish
“reasonable” epistemic viewpoints, to which duties of reciprocity and
civility are owed, from unreasonable viewpoints, and describes the nature
of the reasons that the majority must provide to reasonable epistemic
dissenters. Expanding upon Rawls’s focus on moral disagreement, it
explains when, and to whom, reciprocity is owed in areas of factual
disagreement. Most crucially, in this era of “fake news” and polarized
opinion about matters of scientific fact, it articulates a normative principle
defining when and to whom such duties are not owed.
Part I of this Article introduces Rawls’s discussion of political
liberalism and the problem of reasonable pluralism, explaining Rawls’s
solution to that problem via the principle of public reason. Part I also
elaborates upon the concept of epistemic pluralism as an omission from
Rawls’s account and asks whether the phenomenon of epistemic
pluralism raises legitimacy concerns similar to those raised by the
normative pluralism on which Rawls focuses. Part II discusses the history
of mandatory vaccination and the normative and empirical debates
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surrounding vaccinations, followed by an examination of judicial and
legislative responses to challenges to mandatory vaccination policies. Part
III assesses the extent to which the phenomenon of epistemic pluralism
poses the same challenges to the legitimacy of majoritarian public policy
as normative pluralism. It develops a principle of epistemic public reason
and, applying that principle to the example of empirical disagreement
about vaccination, demonstrates that most empirical antivaccinationist
arguments are epistemically unreasonable. Part IV considers other areas
of doctrinal confusion as to which the principle of epistemic public reason
could productively be applied.
II. THE PROBLEMS OF NORMATIVE AND EPISTEMIC PLURALISM
A. Normative Pluralism and the Overlapping Consensus
In his later work, Rawls addressed what he described as the
fundamental question of political philosophy: “how is it possible for there
to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who
remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and
moral doctrines?”12 While he continued to believe that his own
comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness13 remained a reasonable
comprehensive position, Rawls recognized that a key assumption
underlying his work in A Theory of Justice—that universal agreement on
a single comprehensive moral or philosophical doctrine is achievable in
principle in a democratic society characterized by freedom of conscience
and expression—was mistaken. Following his realization that “a basic
feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism—the fact that a
plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious,
philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its culture of free
institutions,”14 Rawls developed a theory of political liberalism—a
political conception of justice that seeks to articulate a model for social
cooperation among citizens in a society characterized by reasonable
pluralism.
Rawls’s solution to the problem of reasonable pluralism is to
distinguish between the political conception of liberal democracy shared
by all “reasonable” members of liberal democratic society and the diverse
comprehensive views in which each individual’s commitment to that
12. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 4.
13. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev’d ed., 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly ed., 2001). [hereinafter
RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS].
14. JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573 (Samuel
Freeman ed., 2001).
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political conception is ultimately grounded. He argues that, although the
“burdens of judgment” in a society characterized by freedom of
conscience preclude consensus on questions of ultimate moral value,
there exists an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive
doctrines that lead their adherents to support what Rawls identifies as a
“reasonable” conception of justice.15 By emphasizing the shared values
of the overlapping consensus and the family of reasonable political
conceptions of justice derived from that consensus, citizens may put aside
the disagreements between their comprehensive doctrines in order to
participate in a society that embodies their shared political values and
facilitates the goal of mutual cooperation.16
The fact of reasonable pluralism as an inevitable and permanent feature
of a liberal democratic system raises vexing questions concerning the
legitimacy of coercive state policies imposed on dissenting members of
the political community. The fundamental idea behind Rawls’s principle
of public reason is that legitimate political decisions involving
“constitutional essentials”17 and matters of “basic justice”18 must be
justified by reasons that could be accepted by anyone who accepts the
fundamental normative commitments of liberal democracy. The principle
is grounded in two related concepts democracy—the duty of civility19 and
the criterion of reciprocity20— that embody the fundamental principle of
15. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 131–50.
16. Rawls offers the work of Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im as an example of how the political
doctrine of liberal constitutionalism may be derived from comprehensive religious doctrine. An-Na’im
writes that “[t]he Qur’an does not mention constitutionalism, but human rational thinking and experience
have shown that constitutionalism is necessary for realizing the just and good society prescribed by the
Qur’an. An Islamic justification and support for constitutionalism is important and relevant for Muslims.
Non-Muslims may have their own secular or other justifications.” RAWLS, supra note 14, at 590–91 n.46
(quoting ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 52–57 (1990)); cf. William R. O’Neill, Modernity and Its Religious
Discontents: Catholic Social Teaching and Public Reason, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
295 (2006) (arguing that Catholic doctrine is consistent with the overlapping consensus of reasonable
comprehensive doctrines).
17. Constitutional essentials “are of two kinds: (a) fundamental principles that specify the general
structure of government and the political process; the powers of the legislature, executive and the
judiciary; the scope of majority rule; and (b) equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative
majorities are to respect; such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of conscience,
freedom of thought and of association, as well as the protections of the rule of law.” RAWLS, supra note
7, at 227.
18. Matters of basic justice “relate to the basic structure of society and so would concern questions
of basic economic and social justice and other things not covered by a constitution,” RAWLS, supra note
14, at 575 n.7, and include “such fundamental questions as: who has the right to vote, or what religions
are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured of fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property.” RAWLS,
supra note 7, at 214.
19. “[T]he ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty—the duty of civility—to be able
to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate
and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason.” RAWLS, supra note 7, at 217.
20. “The criterion of reciprocity requires that when those terms are proposed as the most
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mutual respect among democratic citizens. It emphasizes the special
realm of politics as distinct from what Rawls terms the “background
culture,” essentially the free-for-all marketplace of ideas in which
comprehensive doctrines pursue ideological hegemony with little regard
for fairness toward competing views.21 The principle of public reason also
emphasizes the special responsibility placed on citizens as they exercise
political authority through public debate and voting. A citizen engages in
public reason “when he or she deliberates within a framework of what he
or she sincerely regards as the most reasonable political conception of
justice, a conception that expresses political values that others, as free and
equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to
endorse.”22 This requirement of universal justifiability (within the broad
confines of the “reasonable”) rests largely upon the concept of reciprocity
and Rawls’s view of society as a “fair system of cooperation over time
from one generation to the next, where those engaged in cooperation are
viewed as free and equal citizens and normal cooperating members of
society over a complete life.”23 While it leads to surprising conclusions in
this and other contexts,24 the principle of reciprocity is simply a
recognition of the free and equal status of all citizens in a liberal society.25
It is, in essence, an expression of respect for one’s fellow citizens,
acknowledging on the basis of their equal political standing that when
decisions are made by majority vote, they should be made in a manner by
which all reasonable citizens can understand the reasons behind the
decision, even if they disagree with the majority’s application of those
reasons.

reasonable terms of fair cooperation, those proposing them must also think it at least reasonable for others
to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of
an inferior political or social position.” RAWLS, supra note 14, at 576.
21. See id. at 576 n.1.
22. Id. at 581. Ronald Dworkin formulates the principle in a manner that emphasizes its relevance
to the present inquiry: “Public reason requires officials to offer justifications that are based on the political
values of the community and not on comprehensive religious or moral or philosophical doctrines. The
doctrine, therefore, requires judges searching for a justification of the law’s structure to avoid
controversial religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines.” Ronald Dworkin, Rawls and the Law, 72
FORDHAM L. REV. 1387, 1397 (2004).
23. RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS, supra note 13, at 4.
24. Id. at 64 (“What the difference principle requires, then, is that however great the general level
of wealth . . . the existing inequalities are to fulfill the condition of benefiting others as well as ourselves.
This condition brings out that even if it uses the idea of maximizing the expectations of the least
advantaged, the difference principle is essentially a principle of reciprocity”); RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 88 (“[T]he difference principle expresses a conception of reciprocity. It is a
principle of mutual benefit.”).
25. Rawls notes that “[t]here are many liberalisms and related views, and therefore many forms of
public reason specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions . . . The limiting feature of these
forms is the criterion of reciprocity, viewed as applied between free and equal citizens, themselves seen
as reasonable and rational.” RAWLS, supra note 14, at 581.
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It is this manifestation of respect for the political autonomy of
dissenters that Rawls argues bestows legitimacy on the decisions of
electoral majorities pertaining to constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice.26 Non-public reasons, which are drawn from a
comprehensive moral, religious, or philosophical doctrines, are
illegitimate grounds for political action because “[t]here is no reason why
any citizen . . . should have the right to use state power to decide
constitutional essentials as that person’s . . . comprehensive doctrine
directs.”27 Because reasonable pluralism is a natural feature of liberal
freedom of expression and of conscience, if one accepts the premise that
any political action pertaining to constitutional essentials or matters of
basic justice must be justified by reasons that everyone, including
dissenters, could reasonably accept, the very nature of liberal democracy
makes it impossible to justify any such action on the basis of a non-public
reason. The failure to observe the principle of public reason effectively
disenfranchises some group by imposing upon it a legal requirement that
cannot be justified on any grounds that its members might reasonably
accept. This is particularly problematic when the group that does not share
the comprehensive view of the legislative majority is the one most
burdened by the policy in question.28 Rawls argues that permitting such a
coercive imposition of the majority’s comprehensive values violates the
duty of reciprocity, and insists that all political decisions affecting
constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice be made in accordance
with the principle of public reason.
B. Epistemic Pluralism: An Omission from Rawls’s Account
1. Epistemic Pluralism and Legitimacy
Rawls’s account of “reasonable” pluralism—which I will henceforth
refer to as normative pluralism—addresses a dilemma in governing a
complex, ideologically heterogeneous society in a morally legitimate
way. But it significantly understates the scope of the problem in at least
one respect. Rawls is correct that normative pluralism is an intrinsic
feature of a liberal society characterized by free institutions, but his
exclusive focus on the normative component overlooks a second source
26. “Thus when, on a constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, all appropriate government
officials act from and follow public reason, and when all reasonable citizens think of themselves ideally
as if they were legislators following public reason, the legal enactment expressing the opinion of the
majority is legitimate law.” Id.; see also RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 253.
27. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 226.
28. Cf. THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND
ITS LIMITS (2008) (discussing the problem of “persistent minorities” and democratic legitimacy).
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of pluralism, which I shall refer to as epistemic pluralism. Epistemic
pluralism refers to pluralism of beliefs not along the normative axis,
which Rawls emphasized, but along the empirical one. Not only do
citizens in a liberal democracy fundamentally disagree about questions of
normative value, they also disagree to a significant extent about empirical
facts.29 These empirical beliefs can be as deeply held, as central to
personal identity, and as resistant to reconsideration as the normative
views on which Rawls focuses his discussion.30
The phenomenon of epistemic pluralism raises problems concerning
the legitimacy of democratic governance analogous to those posed by
normative pluralism. If Rawls is correct that the coercive apparatus of the
state cannot legitimately impose policies grounded in normative views
that dissenters cannot reasonably accept, then it would seem to follow that
such coercion is equally illegitimate when grounded upon empirical
beliefs that dissenters reject.
2. Sources and Characteristics of Epistemic Pluralism
Rawls was content simply to ascribe the inevitability of normative
pluralism to the “burdens of judgment” and the operation of “free
institutions” in a liberal democratic state.31 Without disagreeing with that
ultimate conclusion, the more empirically oriented may wish to parse out
how these mechanics lead to a permanent state of epistemic pluralism.
This section briefly surveys the sources of empirical disagreement,
examining how psychological features of human cognition and
institutional features of liberal democracy work together to produce
entrenched disagreement concerning matters of empirical fact. It will also
consider whether, given the psychological linkages in the formation of
normative and empirical beliefs, the distinction between normative and
epistemic pluralism is conceptually viable.
a. The Non-Ideal Burdens of Judgment
Asking what can account for the persistence of normative pluralism,
Rawls discards the explanations that “most people hold views that
advance their own more narrow interests” and that “people are often
29. See supra notes 4–6.
30. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 3; Dan M. Kahan et al., The Second National Risk and Culture
Study: Making Sense of—and Making Progress in—The American Culture War of Fact, THE CULTURAL
COGNITION
PROJECT
AT
YALE
LAW
SCHOOL
(2007),
https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/22049/629.pdf (finding individuals’
empirical views and perceptions of risk closely aligned with their location on a 2-dimensional personality
assessment measuring hierarchical/egalitarian and individualist/communitarian normative tendencies).
31. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 36–37, 55–57.
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irrational and not very bright,” not because he believes those statements
to be false, but because of his commitment to “always work[ing] at first
within ideal theory.”32 But that commitment seems an ill fit to the project
of Political Liberalism, and to those of us who do not share it, it is
apparent that the idiosyncratic processes of human belief formation
contribute significantly to the entrenchment of normative and epistemic
pluralism. The process of empirical belief formation is influenced by nonrational factors via a suite of psychological and other phenomena that
collectively cause the process of real-world belief formation to bear little
resemblance to Rawls’s rationalistic ideal.
The human brain is not an ideal truth-producing device; it is a
biological organ the structure, operation, and limitations of which have
been shaped by eons of evolutionary pressure.33 This pressure has not
been uniformly toward veridicality of belief. By the logic of natural
selection, the ability to form veridical beliefs is valuable only
instrumentally, insofar as it contributes toward survival and
reproduction.34 Thus, veridicality of belief formation must be balanced
against conservation of the scarce energy and resources necessary to
operate a complex brain as well as scarcity of computational time when
survival can depend on the ability to make decisions near-instantly. Our
brains evolved to delegate much routine decision-making to cognitive
heuristics—rules of thumb that, evolutionarily speaking, make the “right”
decision most of the time while conserving time and resources.35
Cognitive psychology describes two modes of thinking. The first
(“System 1”) is automatic, quick, and intuitive, while the second (“System
2”) is slower, more deliberative, and requires the expenditure of mental
effort.36 We rely on System 1 thinking constantly to form impressions and
associations between ideas; it is fast, effortless, and often sufficient for
moment-to-moment cognitive operations, but it is also prone to specious
associations, flawed heuristics, and hasty generalization.37 System 2
reasoning can work to correct the shortcomings of System 1, but because
System 2 thinking requires the expenditure of mental effort, it can become

32. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 55.
33. See generally RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS (2015); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY (1994).
34. Justin T. Mark, Brian B. Marion & Donald D. Hoffman, Natural Selection and Veridical
Perceptions, 266 J. THEORETICAL BIO. 504 (2010) (applying game-theoretic evolutionary simulations to
conclude that the natural selection of perceptual apparatus may drive perceptual veridicality to extinction);
see generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS
AND RELIGION (2012); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
35. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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overloaded or distracted, falling back on System 1’s quick associations to
fill in for the lack of available System 2 bandwidth.38 Among many other
effects, cognitive psychologists have found that humans tend to interpret
new information in such a way as to confirm their existing beliefs,39 to
view the arguments of others more critically than their own,40 and to be
irrationally influenced by the framing of identical risks.41
Not all failures of veridical belief formation are failures of rationality,
at least where the “rational” is defined as maximizing the individual’s
personal utility. Just as evolutionary pressures on the brain facilitated the
development of adaptive but non-veridical heuristic decision making, so
do social forces exert similar pressures on individuals. Such pressures act
both affirmatively, by incentivizing individuals to hold or profess groupconforming empirical beliefs without regard to those beliefs’ veridicality,
and negatively, by disincentivizing individuals from investing substantial
time and resources into improving the veridicality of their beliefs.42
The affirmative side of these social pressures involve a set of related
phenomena that I will collectively refer to as cognitive tribalism. Perhaps
the most significant manifestation of cognitive tribalism is “identity
protective cognition,” that is, the tendency of individuals to espouse both
empirical and normative views shared by some in-group with which they
strongly identify.43 Individuals’ empirical beliefs are influenced by the
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998); SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING (1993); Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and
Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979).
40. See, e.g., Emmanuel Trouche et al., The Selective Laziness of Reasoning, 40 COGNITIVE SCI.
2122 (2015); Ulrike Hahn & Mike Oaksford, The Rationality of Informal Argumentation: A Bayesian
Approach to Reasoning Fallacies, 114 PSYCHOL. REV. 704 (2007).
41. KAHNEMAN, supra note 35; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions
and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981); see generally James R. Steiner-Dillon, Epistemic
Exceptionalism, 52 IND. L. REV. 207 (2019) (surveying literature on cognitive illusions and bias).
42. See, e.g., Nir Grinberg et al., Fake News on Twitter During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election,
363 SCI. 374, 376 (2019) (finding congruency between the user’s political orientation and the alignment
of the article as “the most dominant factor in sharing decisions for political news” on Twitter, and noting
that this finding “is consistent with an extensive body of work showing that individuals evaluate beliefincongruent information more critically than belief-congruent information.”).
43. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes are You Going
to Believe—Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 852 (2009);
Dan M. Kahan et al., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk
Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465, 470 (2007). Identity protective cognition is a form of
motivated reasoning. “The . . . psychological theory of motivated reasoning holds that when decision
makers have a preference regarding the outcome of an evaluative task, they are more likely to arrive at
that desired conclusion by engaging in inadvertently biased processes for ‘accessing, constructing, and
evaluating beliefs.’” Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal Judgments—An Analytic Review,
9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 309 (2013) (quoting Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning,
108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480 (1990)).
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views of social groups—religious, political, communal, or otherwise—
with which they identify; they are motivated to adopt the prevailing
beliefs of these communities and to rationalize inconsistencies.44 As
Kahan et al. explain:
Individual wellbeing, material and emotional, is bound up with
membership in various self-defining groups. Rejecting factual beliefs
widespread within such a group can undermine individual well-being,
either by threatening to estrange a person from his peers or by forcing that
person to contemplate the social incompetence of those he identifies with.
As a means of psychological self-defense, then, people tend to process
information in a selective fashion that bolsters beliefs dominant within
their self-defining groups. 45

Cognitive tribalism also manifests in the related phenomenon of
cultural cognition, which describes the manner in which individuals’
normative commitments affect their perceptions of risk. As Kahan et al.
explain, “[t]his theory posits that people tend to conform factual beliefs
about risk to their cultural evaluations of putatively dangerous behavior.
As a result of various cognitive mechanisms, people are motivated to
believe that behavior they find noble is also socially beneficial (or at least
benign) and behavior they find base is also socially harmful.”46
The cultural cognition effect is vividly demonstrated by Kahan et al.’s
study of the video evidence on which the Supreme Court relied in Scott v.
Harris.47 The authors showed the video at issue in that case, which the
Supreme Court claimed would “speak for itself” in showing that the
respondent’s driving created a “substantial and immediate risk of physical
injury to others,”48 to a sample of 1,350 individuals and asked them to rate
their agreement with the statements that Harris’s driving, as depicted in
44. Robert Jervis, Understanding Beliefs, 27 POL. PSYCH. 641 (2006); see also Per Espen Stoknes,
Rethinking Climate Communications and the “Psychological Climate Paradox,” 1 ENERGY RES. & SOC.
SCI. 161, 165 (2014).
45. Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, supra note 43, at 852 (citing Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele,
When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the Self, 26 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1151 (2000)); Geoffrey L. Cohen, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation
Reduces Ideological Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility in Negotiation, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 415 (2007); Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic and Systematic
Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 84–97 (1997); see also
Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government, 1 BEHAV. PUB. POL’Y 54,
56-57 (2017) (“[I]dentity-protective cognition can be viewed as psychic self-defense mechanism that
steers individuals away from beliefs that could alienate them from others on whose support they depend
in myriad domains of everyday life.”).
46. Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, supra note 43, at 852; see also Dan M. Kahan, Jenkins‐Smith, &
Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition of Scientific Consensus, 14 J. OF RISK RES. 147, 148 (2010) (“The
cultural cognition thesis asserts that individuals are psychologically disposed to believe that behavior they
[and their peers] find honorable is socially beneficial and behavior they find base socially detrimental.”).
47. 550 U.S. 372 (2007); see Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, supra note 43 at 853.
48. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 n.5, 386.
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the video, put “members of the public at great risk of death” and “put the
police at serious risk of death.”49 The results showed that the subjects’
assessment of the risks and of the reasonableness of the police’s actions
were closely associated with their cultural style. Subjects displaying a
“hierarchical and individualist” style were more likely to see the risk
posed by Harris’s driving as significant, to agree that the use of potentially
lethal force against him was justified, and to blame Harris rather than the
police.50 Those whose style aligned with the “egalitarian and
communitarian” type, however, were more likely “to reject the conclusion
that the police acted reasonably in using deadly force to terminate the
chase.”51 Kahan et al. explain that these results are consistent with other
studies “which show that competing cultural outlooks of these varieties
dispose people to disagree about the facts of all manner of putative
dangers – from climate change to gun control to HPV vaccinations for
school-age girls.”52
Intelligence, access to information, and education are not correctives
to cognitive tribalism; to the contrary, the polarizing effects of cultural
and identity protective cognition tend to be positively associated with
access to information and technical proficiency.53 Nor is ideological
polarization on empirical matters solely the result of overreliance on
System 1 heuristics—deliberative System 2 processes show the same
vulnerability to identity-protective effects.54 As individuals become more
educated on scientific issues, they become more adept at rationalizing
scientific statements as compatible with their normative priors even when
thinking deliberatively. For example, Kahan et al. found that epistemic
49. Kahan, Hoffman, & Braman, supra note 43, at 854–57.
50. Id. at 862, 879.
51. Id. at 879.
52. Id. at 904 (citing Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 123,
134–36, 139–42 (2007)).
53. See, e.g., Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, Does Correcting Myths about the Flu Vaccine
Work? An Experimental Evaluation of the Effects of Corrective Information, 33 VACCINE 459 (2015)
(information that the influenza vaccine cannot cause influenza resulted in individuals with an initially
high degree of concern about the vaccine self-reporting a lower probability that they would receive it);
Kahan et al., supra note 45 (polarization of interpretation of quantitative data on politically salient issue
was highest among respondents who displayed high numeracy); Dan M. Kahan et al., The Polarizing
Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 732, 732 (2012) (finding that “[m]embers of the public with the highest degrees of science
literacy and technical reasoning capacity were not the most concerned about climate change. Rather, they
were the ones among whom cultural polarization was greatest.”).
54. Kahan et al., supra note 45; Dan M. Kahan, Climate-Science Communication and the
Measurement Problem, 36 ADVANCES IN POL. PSYCHOL. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Kahan, Climate-Science
Communication]; Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8 JUDGMENT
& DECISION MAKING 407 (2013); see Dan M. Kahan et al., Science Curiosity and Political Information
Processing, 38 POL. PSYCHOL. 179, 181 (2017) [hereinafter Kahan et al., Science Curiosity] (surveying
observational studies finding that “individuals most proficient in System 2 reasoning are in fact the most
politically polarized on facts relating to gun control, climate change, and other contested issues”).
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polarization on questions of scientific fact was positively associated with
ordinary science knowledge on empirical questions that have become
components of political identity, but not as to other questions.55 Scienceliterate conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats showed more
disagreement about the reality and causes of anthropogenic climate
change than did their less science-literate peers, but science-literate
individuals showed a uniform risk assessment regardless of ideology with
respect to exposure to the magnetic fields of high-voltage power lines.56
Not only does the profession of ingroup-conforming empirical beliefs
carry social advantage, the negative consequences of holding or
professing empirically false beliefs—at least those relevant to public
policy—are usually quite low. Indeed, it is usually rational for the typical
voter not to invest substantial time and effort into understanding the facts
of complex policy domains because individual voters have virtually no
influence over public decision making.57 Thus, political realities of
attenuated democratic influence align with cognitive predilection to
incentivize low expenditure of effort to acquire politically salient
information and the identity-protective interpretation of such information
one does acquire. These conditions are ripe for the development of
network-centric epistemic pluralism.
b. The Operation of Free Institutions
Finding a deep connection between the conditions necessary for
scientific flourishing and those prevalent in liberal democratic society,
Dan Kahan observed:
It’s no accident that the best philosophical exposition of science’s
distinctive way of knowing—The Logic of Scientific Discovery—and one
of if not the best philosophical expositions of liberal democracy—The
Open Society and its Enemies—were both written by Karl Popper. Only in
a society that denies any institution the authority to stipulate what must be
accepted as true, Popper recognized, can individuals be expected to
develop the inquisitive and disputatious habits of mind that fuel the
scientific engine of conjecture and refutation.58

It may well be that the epistemic openness of democratic liberalism is a
55. Dan M. Kahan, What is the “Science of Science Communication”?, 14 J. SCI. COMM. 1, 4–6
(2015).
56. Id. at 7 (noting that “[p]ersistent nonconvergence—polarization—is in fact pathological. It
occurs when factual issues become entangled in antagonistic cultural meanings that transform positions
on them into badges of loyalty to opposing groups.”); see Kahan et al., supra note 54 at 181 (“Because it
is rational under these circumstances for individuals to form this expressive mode of information
processing, they are likely to marshal all their cognitive resources to do so.”).
57. ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE 52–67 (2d ed. 2016).
58. Kahan, supra note 55, at 7.
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necessary condition for the productive pursuit of scientific inquiry. But it
is also true that the same conditions that give rise to a vibrant scientific
culture also make the entrenchment of diversity of opinion about
empirical matters inevitable. Thus, some measure of epistemic pluralism
is a fait accompli in liberal society. But an additional measure is
contingent upon structures and institutions of contemporary society that
go beyond the bare commitments of liberalism. This section will survey
some of the major institutional contributors to the prevalence of epistemic
pluralism in the United States.
The foundation of entrenched epistemic pluralism in the United States
is surely the culture of political liberalism that Rawls identified. The First
Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in relevant part, that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press.”59 This provision embodies an Enlightenment
commitment to tolerance and rationalism and a belief in the truth-seeking
tendencies of human reason and discourse. Although the First
Amendment’s guarantees have been far from uniformly respected, and its
normative contours remain contested,60 the constitutional commitment to
freedom of conscience and the culture of tolerance of which it is both a
cause and an effect is essential to the flourishing of epistemic pluralism.
The absence of state-imposed orthodoxy gives free rein to the “burdens
of judgment” in a way that inevitably increases the diversity of empirical
viewpoints within the society.
Other factors are not fundamental to the liberal democratic state, but
arise from contingencies of political and technological development. For
example, significant disparities in access to, and quality of, education no
doubt contribute to the scope of disagreement on empirical matters. If
access to education is a scarce resource, its inequitable distribution
facilitates the conditions for entrenched epistemic pluralism. Figure 1
summarizes US Census data reflecting the highest level of educational
attainment for Americans over the age of 18 in 2017.61

59. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
60. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV. 355 (2018); Robert
Post, Legitimacy and Hate Speech, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 651 (2017).
61. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2017 (2017),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/education-attainment/cps-detailed-tables.html.
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In terms of highest level of educational attainment, a plurality of
Americans—about 40%—possessed a partial or complete high school
education but no college. About 29% have either an associate’s degree or
some college credits without a degree. Twenty percent of Americans’
highest educational attainment is a 4-year bachelor’s degree, and only
11% of Americans over 18 had a graduate degree—including master’s,
professional, and doctoral degrees.62 But those numbers only begin to
illustrate the disparities of educational attainment that characterize the
contemporary United States. Figure 1 further summarizes the census data
with respect to each of the major census racial or ethnic categories—nonHispanic whites, Asian Americans, African Americans, and Hispanics.
The results are striking. Asian Americans, the group with the highest
educational attainment, are almost three times more likely than African
Americans to hold a post-graduate degree (21.8% vs. 7.7%), and over five
times more likely than Hispanics (21.8% vs. 4.2%). To the extent that
epistemic injustices in access to education are associated with such
identity-constitutive demographic categories as race, class, gender, or
political affiliation, they have the potential to exacerbate the
entrenchment of epistemic pluralism by transmuting demographic
communities into epistemic ones.63
Closely related to inequalities in access to education is the highly
62. Id.
63. See Ben Kotzee, Education and Epistemic Injustice, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 324, 326–28 (Ian James Kidd, Jose Medina, & Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. eds., 2017);
David Coady, Two Concepts of Epistemic Injustice, 7 EPISTEME 101, 104–05 (2010) (describing disparity
in access to knowledge as a form of distributive epistemic injustice).
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specialized state of human knowledge. Years of study and substantial
expense are necessary to obtain expertise in a single, narrow domain; few
individuals ever achieve that status, and only a vanishingly small number
can claim expertise in more than one domain. Everyone is a layperson in
nearly all domains, victims of humanity’s success in generating more
cumulative knowledge than can be processed by a single mind within a
single lifetime.64 The production of knowledge has become primarily a
collective rather than an individual undertaking, with the consequence
that we are all epistemically dependent on others.65 The result of this
epistemic fragmentation has been the development of persistent epistemic
communities around narrow domains of expertise, creating further space
for epistemic pluralism to flourish.
All of these effects have been facilitated by innovations in
communications technology. At least since the Protestant Reformation’s
savvy utilization of the nascent printing industry,66 advances in
communications technology have made the dissemination of ideas ever
faster, cheaper, and simpler—with predictable consequences for the
expansion of pluralism, both normative and epistemic. Pamphlets, local
newspapers, mass-produced books, radio, broadcast and cable television
all contributed to a world in which communication was easier and less
subject to the control of centralized authorities.67 From one perspective,
the Internet is simply the latest incremental step in the direction of cheap,
unconstrained communication; from another, it has been a revolution. For
the first time in history, a large segment of the human population has
access to a near-global communications platform that bypasses even the
private gatekeepers like publishers, academic peer reviewers, newspaper
editors, and broadcast executives that constrained viewpoint diversity in

64. In 2017, 54,664 research doctorates were awarded by U.S. universities—a slight decline from
the historical high of 55,006 reported in 2015, but consistent with a 3.3% per annum increase since 1957.
NAT’L SCI. FOUND., 2017 DOCTORATE RECIPIENTS FROM U.S. UNIVERSITIES (2018),
https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf19301/assets/report/report.pdf. These newly-minted Ph.D.s have
contributed to the prodigious pace of academic publishing. The International Association for Scientific,
Technical and Medical Publishers estimates that, “[t]here were about 33,100 active scholarly peerreviewed English-language journals in 2018, collectively publishing some 3 million articles a year.” INT’L
ASSOC. FOR SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL & MED. PUBLISHERS, THE STM REPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF
SCIENTIFIC
AND
SCHOLARLY
PUBLISHING
25
(5th
ed.
2018),
https://www.stmassoc.org/2018_10_04_STM_Report_2018.pdf.
65. See John Hardwig, Epistemic Dependence, 82 J. PHIL. 335 (1985).
66. See ANDREW PETTEGREE, BRAND LUTHER: 1517, PRINTING, AND THE MAKING OF THE
REFORMATION (2015).
67. See, e.g., Edward McKernon, Fake News and the Public, 151 HARPER’S MAGAZINE, Oct.
1925, at 528, 529 (difficulty of evaluating reliability of news reports “has increased enormously in recent
years by reason of the rapidly increased efficiency of the distributing mechanism . . . Once the news faker
obtains access to the press wires all the honest editors alive will not be able to repair the mischief he can
do.”).
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“legacy” media.68 On one hand, the Internet has created a world in which
millions enjoy near-instant access to a substantial bulk of all human
knowledge, much of it available without additional charge. On the other,
the circumvention of gatekeeping institutions has contributed to an
epistemic flattening, facilitating a culture of skepticism toward claims of
epistemic authority, expertise, and even the epistemological
methodologies of the former gatekeepers.69 This tendency has been
exacerbated by two distinct factors: the influence of epistemic bad actors
or “trolls,” who for political or personal reasons act intentionally to spread
false beliefs; and a tendency among the media-consuming public to seek
out identity-confirming sources of information while engaging critically
(or not at all) with identity-disconfirming sources.70
The existence of intentional misinformation online is well documented,
perhaps most prominently by accounts of Russian efforts to influence
American elections through the dissemination of “fake news” via social
media.71 The intentional dissemination of false information in political
68. The International Telecommunication Union “estimates that at the end of 2018, 51.2 per cent
of the global population, or 3.9 billion people, will be using the Internet.” INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
UNION,
STATISTICS
(2018),
https://www.itu.int/en/ITUD/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx.
69. Shanto Iyengar & Douglas S. Massey, Scientific Communication in a Post-Truth Society, 116
PROCEEDINGS NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 7656 (2019); see generally TOM NICHOLS, THE DEATH OF EXPERTISE:
THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST ESTABLISHED KNOWLEDGE AND WHY IT MATTERS (2017); HARRY COLLINS,
ARE WE ALL SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS NOW (2014). For example, survey data collected by the Pew Research
Center found substantial gaps—up to 51 percentage points—between the views of members of the
American Academy for the Advancement of Science and the general public on a number of issues relating
to science or science policy. See Lee Rainie, U.S. Public Trust in Science and Scientists, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (June 27, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/06/27/u-s-public-trust-in-science-andscientists.
70. Iyengar and Massey, supra note 69, at 7657. While user choice under the influence of
motivated reasoning is surely a large contributor to the “silo” effect of online polarization, the marketing
decisions of online content providers exacerbate these tendencies. Platform owners often employ
algorithms that look to a user’s past behavior to decide what content to highlight, while sites emphasize
provocative “clickbait” content to generate page views—thus perpetuating polarization while
disincentivizing the production and dissemination of centrist perspectives. Id. at 7657. Automated “bots,”
programs that emulate human users, can further exacerbate the spread of intentionally false stories. David
M. J. Lazer et al., The Science of Fake News, 359 SCI. 1094, 1095 (2018); see also Onur Varol et al.,
Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, and Characterization, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ELEVENTH INT’L AAAI CONF. ON WEB AND SOCIAL MEDIA 280, 280 (2017),
https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM17/paper/view/15587/14817 (estimating that 9–15% of
Twitter accounts are bots).
71. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND
INTENTIONS
IN
RECENT
US
ELECTIONS
3–4
(2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf. Though the 2016 campaign brought the Russian
government’s online trolling activities into the public consciousness, those activities had been documented
prior to the campaign. See Max Seddon, Documents Show How Russia’s Troll Army Hit America,
BUZZFEED NEWS, June 2, 2014, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/maxseddon/documents-showhow-russias-troll-army-hit-america. Not all online disinformation campaigns are coordinated by foreign
governments or target left-wing candidates. In a series of articles, the New York Times revealed that
“Democratic tech experts” adopted similar tactics, including the dissemination of false information
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campaigns is by no means new,72 but the low cost of dissemination online
and the relative difficulty for many Internet users to identify the source
behind online content makes the Internet a particularly fertile breeding
ground for viral disinformation. One recent study of registered voters
active on Twitter found, excluding partially automated “cyborg”
accounts,73 that 6% of users who shared political content on Twitter
during the month prior to the 2016 presidential election shared content
from a fake news source, and that on average, “content from fake news
sources constituted [] 1.18% of political exposures, or about 10 URLs
during the last month of the election campaign.”74 That average, however,
masks substantial variation associated with age and political orientation.
Older, more conservative users were significantly more likely to be
exposed to and to share content from fake news sources.75 Moreover,
there is some indication that fake news—perhaps due to its contrived
alignment with its target audience’s political identity—is more readily
prone to being shared, and therefore spreads faster through the online

through covert Twitter accounts and Facebook pages, to assist Democratic Senate candidate Doug Jones
in the 2017 special election in Alabama. Scott Shane & Alan Blinder, Secret Experiment in Alabama
Senate
Race
Imitated
Russian
Tactics,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Dec.
19,
2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/us/alabama-senate-roy-jones-russia.html; Scott Shane & Alan
Blinder, Democrats Faked Online Push to Outlaw Alcohol in Alabama Race, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/07/us/politics/alabama-senate-facebook-roy-moore.html; see also Jim
Rutenberg, Fake News as ‘Moral Imperative’? Democrats’ Alabama Move Hints at Ugly 2020, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/13/business/media/democrats-disinformationelection-interference.html (“[T]he progressives’ political caper in Alabama sent a chilling message to the
rest of us: Reality-warping attacks are now coming from inside the house.”); cf. Andrew Coyne, Opinion,
There Are Lies, Damn Lies and Election Campaigns, NAT’L POST (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://nationalpost.com/opinion/andrew-coyne-there-are-lies-damn-lies-and-election-campaigns
(“While it is true that new technology has made it easier to spread falsehoods in greater volume at lower
cost and less detectability than before, one suspects what is really behind the panic over ‘fake news’ is
that the [political] parties’ monopoly over it has been broken.”).
72. To give but one infamous example, during the 2000 Republican primary campaign, voters in
South Carolina received telephone calls from a putatively independent polling organization—actually
operated by the George W. Bush campaign—implying that John McCain had fathered an illegitimate
African-American child. Ann Banks, Dirty Tricks, South Carolina and John McCain, THE NATION, Jan.
14, 2008, https://www.thenation.com/article/dirty-tricks-south-carolina-and-john-mccain.
73. Excluding suspected cyborg accounts has the effect of excluding a large majority of the fake
news in the sample—the authors found that “[a] mere 0.1% of the panel accounted for 79.8% of shares
from fake news sources, and 1% of panel members consumed 80.0% of the volume from fake news
sources.” Grinberg et al., supra note 42, at 375. But cyborg accounts are still subject to human oversight;
fully-automated “bot” accounts magnify the malicious efforts of fake news producers by dispersing their
epistemic pollution into the online ecosystem with no active human involvement. See Chengcheng Shao
et al., The Spread of Low-Credibility Content by Social Bots, 9 NATURE COMMS. 4787, 4791 (2018)
(finding that accounts likely to be bots “are responsible for a large share of the traffic that carries
misinformation”).
74. Grinberg et al., supra note 42, at 376.
75. Id. According to the study, 21% of users on the “extreme right” shared content from fake news
sources.
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environment, than news from mainstream sources.76
For all the trolls’ efforts, their impact is contingent upon human
epistemic practices.77 Thus, the second factor—the tendency of cognitive
tribalism to induce online siloing—contributes more substantially to the
epistemic fracturing of the internet era.78 Studies of social media show
clustering behavior on both ends of the political spectrum, in which users
tend disproportionately to read and share content.79 These practices
exacerbate and entrench epistemic pluralism insofar as participants’
access to news is filtered through ideologically motivated sources that
lack mainstream journalism’s professional commitment, however
imperfectly observed, to objective and truthful reporting,80 and their
impressions of the news that is shared are shaped by the “echo chamber”
of ideologically aligned social media users. As Lazer et al. explain,
“[h]omogeneous social networks…reduce tolerance for alternative views,
amplify attitudinal polarization, boost the likelihood of accepting
ideologically compatible news, and increase closure to new
information.”81
3. Epistemic Pluralism and Normative Reductivism
Cognitive tribalism and the other effects described in Part I(B)(2)(a)
blur the distinction between normative and epistemic pluralism insofar as
they suggest that our beliefs are not formed via the purely rational
76. Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News Online, 359
SCI. 1146, 1149 (2018) (study of the spread of true and false news on Twitter, finding that “that falsehoods
were 70% more likely to be retweeted than the truth”); but see Grinberg et al., supra note 42, at 376
(finding that fake news was no more likely to be shared when controlling for belief congruence).
77. See, e.g., JOHN SIDES, MICHAEL TESLER & LYNN VAVRECK, IDENTITY CRISIS: THE 2016
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE BATTLE FOR THE MEANING OF AMERICA 198–199 (2018) (“Although
Russian interference was and is deeply concerning, there are many reasons to doubt that it changed the
outcome of the election . . . Given the billions if not trillions of tweets and posts on [YouTube, Facebook,
and Twitter] during the election campaign, Russian-sponsored content was an infinitesimal fraction.”);
Vosoughi, Roy & Aral, supra note 76, at 1150 (finding that “human behavior contributes more to the
differential spread of falsity and truth than automated robots do,” and recommending “that misinformation
containment policies should also emphasize behavioral interventions”).
78. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL
MEDIA (2018); ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU (2012).
79. YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK PROPAGANDA:
MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION, AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 54–60 (2018); see also
Ana Lucía Schmidt et al., Anatomy of News Consumption on Facebook, 114 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. 3035 (2017); Michela Del Vicario et al., The Spreading of Misinformation Online, 113 PROCEEDINGS
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 554–59 (2016); Alessandro Bessi et al., Trend of Narratives in the Age of
Misinformation, 10 PLOS ONE e0134641 (2015); Alessandro Bessi et al., Viral Misinformation: The Role
of Homophily and Polarization, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORLD
WIDE WEB 355, 356 (2015).
80. Del Vicario et al., supra note 79, at 557–58.
81. Lazer et al., supra note 70, at 1095.
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processes that Rawls idealizes. Can a meaningful line be drawn between
an individual’s normative views and her empirical beliefs, or are the two
so inextricably intertwined as to confound any attempts to distinguish
pluralism grounded in comprehensive normative views from that
grounded in empirical disagreement? Does every apparent disagreement
about empirical fact ultimately reduce to a disagreement about values? If
so, then a justification for Rawls’s omission of epistemic pluralism from
his account of political liberalism is apparent: epistemic pluralism is not
conceptually distinct from the “reasonable pluralism” that Rawls
discusses, and it need not be addressed separately.
In considering this question, we must be clear about the sense in which
we mean that a superficially empirical disagreement “reduces” to one
about normative value. If we designate the claim that superficially factual
disagreements can be explained by deeper disagreement about matters of
normative value “normative reductivism,” we can articulate that claim in
a strong and a weak sense:
Strong normative reductivism: Every aspect of a superficially empirical
disagreement reduces completely to one or more disagreements about
normative value. Disagreements about value explain all variation in belief
concerning
the
superficially
empirical
disagreement.
Weak normative reductivism: Some aspects of a superficially empirical
disagreement may reduce to disagreements about normative value, but the
empirical component does not reduce completely. At least some variation
in belief concerning the superficially empirical disagreement cannot be
explained by disagreements about value.

Many superficially empirical disagreements are characterized at least
by weak normative reductivism. As discussed in Part I(B)(2)(a), the
distinction between “fact” and “value” is complicated by the bidirectional
influence in belief formation of “ought” and “is.” Individuals’ beliefs
concerning matters of “objective” fact can be heavily influenced by their
prior normative commitments, and their normative conceptions of the
good are often informed by their beliefs about the external world.
The conceptual viability of the distinction between epistemic and
normative pluralism, however, depends on whether all superficially
empirical disagreements are characterized by strong normative
reductivism. An affirmative answer would require rejecting this Article’s
taxonomy of pluralisms; if individuals’ normative priors completely
determine their empirical beliefs in all cases, then a conceptual distinction
between normative and epistemic pluralism would be spurious. There are
some superficially empirical disagreements in which an explanation
grounded in strong normative reductivism seems plausibly sufficient —
for example, the claim that President Obama was “a gay Muslim from
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Kenya working to undermine the United States,”82 or some pro-life
activists’ arguments that developing fetuses are capable of feeling the
pain during the abortion procedure earlier in the pregnancy than is
recognized by the mainstream medical consensus.83 But to acknowledge
that strong normative reductivism explains superficial empirical
disagreement in some cases does not resolve the inquiry.
At least some empirical disagreements are only weakly normatively
reductive, and some are not normatively reductive at all. To take a simple
example, the statement “that dog is a Boston Terrier” is an empirical one
insofar as it deals with an issue of fact about the external world, and is
one about which disagreement could exist, but it is unlikely that such
disagreement is driven by submerged conflicts of value. Perhaps you are
a subtler judge of variations among similar breeds than I; perhaps you
have better recall of the relevant reference materials, or have greater
experience with this particular breed. In any event, it is unlikely, even if I
never accept your view as correct, that our disagreement is driven by
anything deeper than divergent applications of the agreed criteria by
which dog breeds are identified. But this is a simple question; it is unlikely
to generate widespread dissensus across decades or generations. As
inquiry becomes more general, causal relationships more attenuated, and
the social or political stakes of the issue higher, the tendency toward
normative reductivism increases. Nevertheless, even within the set of
complex empirical questions that give rise to the problem of entrenched
epistemic pluralism, some disagreements are only weakly normatively
reductive.
“Strong” and “weak” normative reductivism, of course, are opposite
ends of a spectrum rather than distinct principles. Figure 2 depicts them
visually on a horizontal axis, with the “weak” end of normative
reductivism on the left side of the axis and the “strong” side on the right.
Arrayed along the line are several propositions in increasing order of
normative reductivism, ranging from “That dog is a Boston Terrier” on
the weak end to “Obama is a gay Muslim” on the strong end.84 The dashed
vertical line in the center represents the point at which normative
reductivism predominates—that is, the point at which a superficially
82. Stephanie McCrummen, “Finally, Someone Who Thinks Like Me,” WASH. POST (Oct. 1,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/finally-someone-who-thinks-likeme/2016/10/01/c9b6f334-7f68-11e6-9070-5c4905bf40dc_story.html.
83. See Belluck, supra note 5; cf. Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary
Review of the Evidence, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 947 (2005).
84. The placement of propositions concerning anthropogenic climate change and genetically
modified organisms in Figure 2 is for illustrative purposes only. While their placement represents my best
assessment of the degree of normative reductiveness of the seemingly empirical disagreements around
those issues, defending those assessments is beyond the scope of this Article. Even if I am incorrect in
those particulars, the conceptual illustration of partial normative reductivism would remain viable.
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empirical disagreement is mostly explained by conflicting normative
values. How can we distinguish the degree of normative reductivism in a
superficially empirical disagreement? A useful heuristic is to hold moral
disagreement constant—to ask whether the parties to the disagreement
share the same set of fundamental normative commitments. If so, then a
disagreement about empirical claims is unlikely to be reducible to a
conflict of values. While the question of which debates feature a broadly
shared set of normative commitments is itself an empirical one as to
which we have little direct evidence, the case study selected for this
Article, concerning the debate around the safety and efficacy of
vaccination, falls comfortably into this category. Notwithstanding the
constructed and contingent nature of any normative vision of health,85
antivaccinationists and the mainstream medical community appear to
broadly agree on what constitutes optimal health; their disagreement
arises primarily with respect to the question whether the practice of
immunization is causally associated with what they mutually agree
constitute “better” or “worse” health outcomes.86 If it is the case that some
empirical disagreements are only weakly normatively reductive, then it is
also the case that a conceptual distinction between normative and
epistemic pluralism can be usefully maintained.

85. See generally, e.g., Stefan Timmermans & Steven Haas, Towards a Sociology of Disease, 30
SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 659 (2008); MICHEL FOUCAULT, ABNORMAL: LECTURES AT THE
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1974–1975 (2003); Phil Brown, Naming and Framing: The Social Construction of
Diagnosis and Illness, 35 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 34 (1995).
86. Proponents and opponents of vaccination largely agree that such conditions as measles,
smallpox, and autism constitute sub-optimal health outcomes. As Kirkland points out, mainstream experts
and antivaccination activists differ in their conception of autism as a matter of pre-birth “wiring” or
environmental “injury,” but both agree that it is a departure from optimal cognitive health. ANNA
KIRKLAND, VACCINE COURT: THE LAW AND POLITICS OF INJURY 174–76 (2016). However, the social
constructedness of any conception of health is demonstrated by the “neurodiversity” movement, which
contends that autism is not a “disease” to be cured but rather as a “naturally occurring cognitive variation[]
with distinctive strengths.” STEVE SILBERMAN, NEUROTRIBES: THE LEGACY OF AUTISM AND THE FUTURE
OF NEURODIVERSITY 16 (2015).
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Psychological evidence likewise suggests that the premise of universal
strong normative reductivism is false. Consider, for example, Kahan’s
study of politicized belief concerning anthropogenic climate change.87
Kahan’s results showed an unmistakable association between political
ideology, “ordinary science intelligence,” and the likelihood of giving a
correct answer to the question whether climate change is primarily driven
by anthropogenic factors.88 “[T]he likelihood of a correct response sloped
downward for individuals who were conservative Republicans: at a +1
[standard deviation on the ordinary science intelligence scale] score, the
predicted probability of a correct answer was only 13% . . . for such
individuals—as opposed to 90% for liberal Democrats.”89 Evidence of
substantial normative reductivism, surely, but not of the complete
normative reductivism that would obviate the distinction between
normative and epistemic pluralism.
Other evidence suggesting that particular cognitive styles can mitigate
the effects of cognitive tribalism further supports the view that at least
some empirical disagreements are only weakly normatively reductive.
Tetlock, for example, shows that some cognitive styles are better at
applying empirical evidence to make accurate predictions, whether
compatible with the individual’s normative preferences or not.90
Evaluating the ability of political experts to make accurate predictions
within their own fields, Tetlock finds that
[l]ow scorers [on measures of predictive calibration and discrimination]
look like hedgehogs: thinkers who “know one big thing,” aggressively
extend the explanatory reach of that one big thing into new domains,
display bristly impatience with those who “do not get it,” and express
considerable confidence that they are already pretty proficient forecasters,
at least in the long term. High scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know
many small things (tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes,
see explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as
exercises in flexible “ad hocery” that require stitching together diverse
sources of information, and are rather diffident about their own forecasting
prowess.91

Similarly, Kahan et al.’s recent work explaining the virtues of “science
curiosity” —“a general disposition . . . that reflects the motivation to seek
out and consume scientific information for personal pleasure”— as a
corrective to the polarizing effects of cognitive tribalism suggests that a
87.
88.
89.
90.
(2005).
91.

Kahan, Climate-Science Communication, supra note 54.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN WE KNOW?
Id. at 73–75.
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genuinely epistemic component exists in many, if not all, disagreements
about matters of empirical fact.92 We need not deny that many such
questions are weakly normatively reductive in order to maintain a
conceptual distinction between normative and epistemic pluralism; so
long as at least some disagreement concerns matters of empirical fact that
do not reduce to questions of value, epistemic pluralism is viable as a
conceptually distinct expansion of Rawls’s discussion of normative
pluralism.
III. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO MANDATORY VACCINATION POLICIES: A
CASE STUDY IN EPISTEMIC PLURALISM
In late December 2014 and early January 2015, the Disneyland theme
park in Anaheim, California – the “happiest place on Earth” – became the
site of an outbreak of measles that eventually affected 125 victims across
eight states and three nations.93 Nearly half (45%) of the victims of the
outbreak within California were unvaccinated, including infants too
young to receive the measles-mumps-rubella (“MMR”) vaccination, as
well as children with medical contraindications to vaccination.94 Sixtyseven percent of the unvaccinated victims were “intentionally
unvaccinated because of personal beliefs.”95
Although, in the end, the total number of reported cases of measles in
the United States in 2015 was in line with previous years and was a
significant dropoff from the spike of cases reported in 2014,96 the
92. Kahan et al., Science Curiosity, supra note 54, at 180. The study established a scale of “science
curiosity” and examined whether an individual’s degree of science curiosity affected the individual’s
susceptibility to politically motivated reasoning when incorporating new information about scientific
issues. Both observational and experimental data showed that subjects with high science curiosity were
less susceptible to politically motivated reasoning when exposed to new scientific information. Id. at 186.
93. Jennifer Zipprich et al., Measles Outbreak – California, December 2014–February 2015, 64
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 153 (2015).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports the following number of measles cases
in the United States for each year since 2010:
Year
Number
of Cases
2010
63
2011
220
2012
55
2013
187
2014
667
2015
188
2016
86
2017
120
2018
372
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Disneyland outbreak caught the public’s attention as other outbreaks had
not. Figure 3 illustrates trends in searches on the Google search engine
for the term “measles” from 2004 through 2018. It indicates that public
interest was relatively flat for nearly the entire period, with a sharp spike
beginning in December 2014 and peaking in February 2015, concurrent
with the Disneyland outbreak. Popular attention turned to vaccine refusal
as a cause of the occurrence and longevity of the Disneyland outbreak,97
and subsequent analysis confirmed that a lack of vaccination among the
exposed population played a role in spreading the disease.98 Although
immunization rates greater than 96% are necessary to achieve “herd
immunity” against measles, epidemiological analysis found that
immunization rates among the exposed population were “as low as 50%
and likely no higher than 86%.”99

The public outcry in response to the Disneyland outbreak motivated
the California legislature to reconsider the longstanding “personal belief”
exemption to its vaccination requirement.100 The legislature quickly
passed S.B. 277, which repealed the state’s statutory exemption to its
general requirement that children obtain certain vaccines in order to
attend public schools where the child’s parent or guardian affirmed that

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Measles Cases and Outbreaks, (2019),
http://www.cdc.gov/measles/cases-outbreaks.html. As of October 3, 2019, the CDC reports that 1,250
individual cases of measles have been confirmed in 31 states” in 2019.” Id.
97. See, e.g., Jack Healy & Michael Paulson, Vaccine Critics Turn Defensive Over Measles, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/us/vaccine-critics-turn-defensive-overmeasles.html.
98. Maimuna S. Majumder et al., Substandard Vaccination Compliance and the 2015 Measles
Outbreak, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS 494, 494 (2015).
99. Id.
100. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120365, repealed by S.B. 277, 2015 Cal. Stat. Ch. 35 (2015).
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immunization was “contrary to his or her beliefs.”101 The bill provoked a
powerful antivaccinationist response, described as “possibly the most
strident outpouring of political dissent in recent memory.”102
Nevertheless, Governor Brown signed the bill on June 30, 2015, making
California the third state to lack a religious exemption from its public
school immunization mandate.103
The controversy surrounding S.B. 277 was but one skirmish in a battle
between the mainstream medical establishment and antivaccinationists
that has raged for two hundred years. This Part examines the history of
that battle as a case study in the law’s treatment of epistemic pluralism.
Mandatory vaccination requirements present an ideal case study for
several reasons. The consensus of medical opinion for over two centuries
has held that vaccines are effective and, although not without risk,
generally safe at preventing far greater risks associated with vaccinepreventable disease. Legally mandated vaccination policies have shown
great success at reducing the prevalence of such diseases as smallpox,
poliomyelitis, measles, mumps, rubella, pertussis, and others, saving
countless lives and dollars.104 On the other hand, vaccination involves the
101. S.B. 277, 2015 Cal. Stat. Ch. 35 (2015).
102. Elizabeth Whitman, California Vaccine Bill SB 277: Ban On Personal Exemptions Sparks
Counter Movement Despite Recent Measles Outbreak, INT’L BUS. TIMES, May 20, 2015,
https://www.ibtimes.com/california-vaccine-bill-sb-277-ban-personal-exemptions-sparks-countermovement-1931383.
103. See Phil Willon & Melanie Mason, California Gov. Jerry Brown Signs New Vaccination Law,
One of Nation's Toughest; L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2015, https://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-lngovernor-signs-tough-new-vaccination-law-20150630-story.html. The other two states were Mississippi
and West Virginia. Recently, Maine and New York have also abolished their religious or personal belief
exemptions. See infra note 240. The public controversy did not end with the enactment of S.B. 277. State
authorities discovered that physicians sympathetic to the antivaccinationist cause were granting
unwarranted medical exemptions to children with no medical contraindications to immunization. In
September 2019, the state enacted S.B. __, which creates a standardized medical exemption form, creates
a system by which to monitor “unusually high” exemption certificates by particular physicians, and
provides state health officials the authority to revoke “inappropriate or invalid” medical exemptions. S.B.
276, 2019 Cal. Stat. Ch. 278 (2019). S.B. 276 provoked sometimes violent opposition from
antivaccinationist activists. In August 2019, State Senator Richard Pan, a physician and leader of the
legislative movement to tighten California’s exemption laws, was accosted and physically shoved by an
antivaccination activist. See Hannah Wiley, Anti-Vaxxer Shoves California Lawmaker Who Wrote
Vaccine Crackdown Bill , SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 21, 2019) (noting that the same activist had filed a
petition to recall Senator Pan for, among other things, “treason”), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article234231737.html. On September 13, 2019, another antivaccinationist
protester threw a cup containing what appeared to be menstrual blood at lawmakers on the California
Senate floor, stating “[t]hat’s for the dead babies.” Hannah Wiley & Sophia Bollag, “Blood Is On Your
Hands”: Anti-Vaccine Activist Who Tossed Menstrual Cup On Senators Released, SACRAMENTO BEE
(Sept.
14,
2019),
https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/article235084637.html; see also Dustin Gardner, Anti-Vaccine Protester Threw Human Blood In
Menstrual Cup, California Senate Confirms, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Oct. 2, 2019) (confirming that
the thrown substance was human blood), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Anti-vaccineprotester-threw-human-blood-14486867.php.
104. CDC, Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children—United States, 1900–1998,
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injection into the body of pathogenic agents.105 When legally compelled
against the wishes of the recipient, this practice would seem to be in
tension with the values of bodily autonomy and informed consent that
prevail in other areas of the law.106 Many antivaccinationists have
objected to compulsory immunization on religious or philosophical
grounds, claiming that their beliefs forbid them to receive vaccination and
that governmental policies requiring immunization violate their freedom
of religion or conscience. Others, however, objected on empirical
grounds.107 While the specifics of antivaccinationist empirical objections
have shifted over time, they have consistently rejected either the premise
that vaccines are effective in preventing disease, the premise that the
medical benefits of vaccines, even if effective at prevention, outweigh the
risks of harm caused by vaccination, or both.
Legal authorities’ responses to antivaccinationist objections to
mandatory immunization requirements have closely tracked the
distinction between normative and epistemic pluralism. Although never
expressed in such terms, state legislatures have proven generally willing
to grant exemptions to immunization requirements to individuals whose
objections are grounded in normative principles, but have uniformly
denied exemptions to those whose objections are grounded in empirical
doubts concerning vaccines’ safety or efficacy. Courts, while denying
rights-based exemptions grounded in normative or epistemic pluralism,
have nevertheless embraced that distinction insofar as they have become
active enforcers of the lines drawn by legislatures. Courts closely examine
putative claims for exemption and deny “religious” or “philosophical”
objections that they determine to be pretexts for empirical objections.
A. History of Mandatory Vaccination Policies
The modern vaccination era108 began in 1796 when Edward Jenner
developed the first smallpox vaccine by injecting cowpox virus into the
arm of a boy, James Phipps, who then exhibited immunity to smallpox.109
281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1482 (1999); James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination
Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 833 (2001).
105. A vaccine is a suspension of attenuated or killed “microorganisms (bacteria, viruses, or
rickettsias) or derivative antigenic (e.g., proteins or peptides).” Hodge & Gostin, supra note 104, at 836.
106. See infra note 227 and accompanying text.
107. See generally Robert M Wolfe & Lisa K Sharp, Anti-Vaccinationists Past and Present, 325
BRITISH MED. J 430 (2002); Hodge & Gostin, supra note 104, at 844–45; Martin Kaufman, The American
Anti-Vaccinationists and Their Arguments, 41 BULL. HIST. MED. 463 (1967).
108. Variolation against smallpox was practiced in Asia from the early second century. See Hodge
& Gostin, supra note 104, at 837.
109. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 376 (2d ed. 2008);
Hodge & Gostin, supra note 104, at 833, 839–40; Stefan Riedel, Edward Jenner and the History of
Smallpox and Vaccination, 18 BAYLOR U. MED. CTR. PROCS. 21, 23 (2005); see EDWARD JENNER, AN
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In the ensuing centuries, vaccination has become a key component of
public health policy through both voluntary and mandatory interventions.
Through the principle of “herd immunity,” in which a critical mass of
immunized individuals protects the entire population by preventing
disease from gaining a foothold from which to spread,110 vaccination is
credited with eliminating or significantly reducing the incidence of such
life-threatening diseases as smallpox, polio, measles, and pertussis.111
Widespread vaccination has been widely credited with saving countless
lives and was recognized by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention as one of the ten greatest public health achievements of the
twentieth century.112
In the United States, state and municipal authorities have enacted
mandatory vaccination requirements in response to disease outbreaks
since the early nineteenth century.113 The development of routinized
immunization requirements applicable in non-epidemic circumstances
came a bit later, and such policies have generally been limited to three
groups: public school children, health care workers, and members of the
military.114 Of these, mandates pertaining to public school students have
been the most controversial and have generated the most significant legal
challenges. The first such requirement was imposed by the city of Boston
in 1827, which required public school students to provide a certificate of
immunization against smallpox.115 Hodge and Gostin survey the spread
of mandatory vaccination requirements for public school attendance
during the 19th century:
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts incorporated its own
school vaccination law in 1855, New York in 1862,
Connecticut in 1872, and Pennsylvania in 1895. Other
northeast states soon passed their own requirements. The trend
toward compulsory child vaccination as a condition of school
attendance eventually spread to states in the Midwest (e.g.,
Indiana (1881), Illinois and Wisconsin (1882), Iowa (1889)),
South (e.g., Arkansas and Virginia (1882)), and West (e.g.,
INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE VARIOLAE VACCINAE (1796).
110. GOSTIN, supra note 109, at 652 n.33.
111. Id. at 376; cf. Willem G. van Panhuis et al., Contagious Diseases in the United States from
1888 to the Present, 369 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2152, 2156 (2013) (estimating that “103 million cases of
childhood diseases (95% of those that would otherwise have occurred) have been prevented since 1924;
in the past decade alone, 26 million cases (99% of those that would otherwise have occurred) were
prevented” by vaccination).
112. CDC, supra note 104.
113. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 104, at 843.
114. See GOSTIN, supra note 109, at 379–81; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MANDATORY
VACCINATIONS: PRECEDENT AND CURRENT LAWS (2011).
115. GOSTIN, supra note 109, at 379; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 114, at 2–
3.
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California (1888)), though not without considerable political
debate.116

By 1905, approximately half of the states required proof of smallpox
vaccination for public school students,117 and by 1942, only six states
lacked a smallpox vaccination requirement for public school students.118
States began imposing vaccination requirements for other diseases, such
as diphtheria, in the 1930s.119 The widespread use of immunization
requirements in public schools for diseases other than smallpox began in
response to measles outbreaks in the 1960s;120 currently, all 50 states have
laws mandating the immunization of public school children against a
variety of diseases.121
B. Normative and Epistemic Pluralism in the Antivaccination Movement
1. Themes in Antivaccinationist Argument
Although the Jennerian method of immunization was quickly accepted
by the mainstream medical establishment of the early nineteenth century,
opposition soon arose among the public and alternative medical
communities.122 Antivaccinationist sentiment has waxed and waned since
then, experiencing periods of relative popularity and others in which the
public largely accepted the mainstream medical community’s consensus
that vaccines are a safe and effective method of preventing disease.123 On
the whole, though, antivaccinationist sentiment for the past two centuries
has been remarkably consistent in its major themes. Antivaccinationists
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries campaigned against the practice

116. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 104, at 851 (footnotes omitted). Willrich recounts that “[b]y the
1890s, the American regime of compulsory vaccination included federal inspection of immigrants, some
provision for compulsory vaccination of public schoolchildren in most states, and universal vaccination
orders issued by local health boards during epidemics.” Michael Willrich, “The Least Vaccinated of Any
Civilized Country”: Personal Liberty and Public Health in the Progressive Era, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 76, 77
(2008).
117. GOSTIN, supra note 109, at 379.
118. William Fowler, Principal Provisions of Smallpox Vaccination Laws and Regulations in the
United States, 56 PUBLIC HEALTH REP. 325, 325 (1942).
119. William Fowler, State Diphtheria Immunization Requirements, 57 PUB. HEALTH REP. 325,
325 (1942).
120. GOSTIN, supra note 109, at 379.
121. Id. at 380; see also CDC, STATE VACCINATION REQUIREMENTS (2017),
https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/imz-managers/laws/state-reqs.html.
122. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 104, at 844.
123. Writing in 1967, Kaufman explained that “[w]ith the improvements in medical practice and
the popular acceptance of the state and federal governments’ role in public health, the anti-vaccinationists
slowly faded from view, and the movement collapsed.” Kaufman, supra note 107, at 478. Subsequent
experience shows antivaccinationism to have been more resilient than Kaufman anticipated.
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in terms that foreshadowed the claims of antivaccinationist arguments
today:
[Antivaccinationists] portrayed vaccines as foreign substances, or poisons,
capable of causing more harm than good . . . . The effectiveness of the
vaccine itself led to a progressive, albeit apathetic, argument: since the
vaccine has worked, why should individuals continue to be subjected to the
harms of vaccination unless there exists an actual threat of disease in the
community? Public health authorities were characterized as abusive,
untrustworthy, and paternalistic. Resisting public health efforts was
equated with fighting government oppression. Antivaccinationists asserted
that vaccinations . . . were contrary to their sacred religious beliefs.124

Three major categories of argument recurred in antivaccinationist
opposition to the practice of immunization in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries: (1) Medical disagreements consisting of (a) empirical
doubts about the safety and efficacy of vaccines or about the severity of
the diseases they purport to prevent, and (b) competing claims to
legitimacy between the mainstream medical establishment, represented
foremost by the American Medical Association (AMA), and various
“alternative” medical practitioners; (2) moral or religious disagreements
consisting of (a) appeals to liberty or human rights against mandatory
vaccination, and (b) appeals to God or natural law against the
introduction of “unnatural” or “unclean” matter into the body; and (3) ad
hominem attacks on the motives of the mainstream medical
establishment, generally consisting of variations on the claim that
mainstream physicians intentionally perpetuate disease for the sake of
financial gain.125
Although the contemporary vaccination debate is heavily influenced
by the relatively recent assertion that vaccination is causally associated
with the development of childhood autism,126 these themes guide
contemporary antivaccination discourse just as they did in the nineteenth
century. Details have changed, but the broad thrust of antivaccinationist
rhetoric—both normative and empirical—has remained virtually
unaltered for nearly 200 years. This section surveys each of the major
themes in antivaccinationist argument from the earliest days through the
present, while the next section focuses on recent shifts in tone brought
about by Dr. Andrew Wakefield’s claim, in 1998, to have identified a
causal relationship between childhood vaccination and the development
of autism.

124. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 104, at 848–49.
125. Id. at 836, 844.
126. See infra Part II(B)(2).
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a. Empirical Doubts Concerning the Safety or Efficacy of Vaccines
The principal empirical objection that antivaccinationists raise against
the practice of vaccination is that it does no good; that is, vaccination fails
to prevent disease as the medical establishment claims. This was a
recurrent theme of antivaccinationist advocacy against the smallpox
vaccine, made somewhat more plausible by the fact that the germ theory
of disease remained inconclusively established in the nineteenth century.
Nineteenth century antivaccinationists tended to reject the germ theory in
favor of the “miasmatic” theory of disease, which held that diseases
“spontaneously generated in dirt and filth,” and therefore argued that
greater public sanitation would reduce the risk of smallpox epidemics
more effectively than vaccination.127
Like their nineteenth and twentieth century forebears, contemporary
antivaccinationists assert that some, if not all, vaccines are ineffective at
preventing disease.128 Kata’s content analysis of antivaccinationist
websites found that 88% of sites raised doubts concerning the efficacy of
vaccination, including “propositions that vaccination weakens the
immune system, or that immunity is ineffective because vaccinated
individuals still contract diseases.”129
A second argument that antivaccinationists commonly use is that, even
if a vaccine is effective at preventing the disease in question, it also causes
some worse disease or condition. Antivaccinationists in the nineteenth
century attributed all sorts of unwholesome effects to the smallpox
vaccine. Kaufman recounts, for example, the arguments of Dr. J.F.
Banton, “who wrote that vaccination introduces into the bloodstream ‘a
bioplasm, death laden—carrying with it all the vices, passions and
diseases of the cow,’”130 and Dr. H. Lindlahr, who claimed that
127. Kaufman, supra note 107, at 468, 476–77; Hodge and Gostin, supra note 104, at 846–47;
Willrich, supra note 116, at 81.
128. See, e.g., Kelly Brogan, A Shot Never Worth Taking: The Flu Vaccine, GREEN MED INFO (Nov.
28, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.greenmedinfo.com/blog/shot-never-worth-taking-flu-vaccine-3
(asserting that the influenza vaccine “doesn’t work”); Sherry Tenpenny, Outbreaks Proof That Whooping
WITH
VIEWS
(2011),
Cough
Vaccines
Don’t
Work,
NEWS
http://newswithviews.com/Tenpenny/sherri128.htm (“Pertussis-containing vaccines seem to have little
effect on the overall incidence of the infection.”); Mike Adams, CDC Admits Flu Vaccines Don’t Work
(Which is Why You Need a New One Every Year), NATURAL NEWS (May 29, 2011),
http://www.naturalnews.com/032558_flu_shots_wear_off.html.
129. Kata, supra note 8, at 1712; see also Robert M. Wolfe, Lisa K. Sharp & Martin S. Lipsky,
Content and Design Attributes of Antivaccination Web Sites, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3245, 3247 (2002)
(95% of sites claimed that “vaccinations eroded or harmed the immune system,” and 81% of sites “alleged
that vaccines are ineffective or produce temporary immunity”); P. Davies, S. Chapman & J. Leask,
Antivaccination Activists on the World Wide Web, 87 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 22, 24 (2002)
(83% of antivaccinationist websites claimed that vaccines are ineffective, and 54% claimed that vaccines
erode the immune system).
130. Kaufman, supra note 107, at 471 (quoting J.F. BANTON, VACCINATION REFUTED 3 (1882)).
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“[v]accination dries up the mammary glands.”131 Somewhat more
sophisticated was the statistical argument of antivaccinationist Henry
Bergh, who correctly pointed out that “wherever vaccination is generally
and rigidly enforced, the death-rate from tuberculosis is highest,” while
omitting the fact that both mandatory vaccination and tuberculosis were
most common in densely populated urban centers.132 More generally,
antivaccinationists claimed “that syphilis, leprosy, polio, cancer, and a
host of other diseases were inoculated into the bloodstream of innocent
children” by forced immunization.133
This line of argument aligns with the dominant theme of twenty-first
century antivaccinationist advocacy, which maintains that vaccines cause
a host of diseases and conditions far worse than the disease that the
vaccine prevents. For example, Keelan et al.’s study of YouTube videos
concerning vaccination found that substantial percentages of
antivaccinationist videos stated that immunization frequently caused
serious adverse events, permanent injury, or autism.134 Kata’s content
analysis of antivaccinationist websites found that “every
[antivaccinationist] site claimed that vaccines are poisonous and cause
idiopathic illnesses,”135 which aligns with Wolfe et al.’s finding that
100% of antivaccinationist websites “included content suggesting that
vaccines cause idiopathic illness.”136
Another common antivaccinationist tactic since the nineteenth century
has been to minimize the threat of vaccine preventable disease. Kaufman
quotes antivaccinationist J.F. Banton, who “wrote that smallpox was a
‘disease not so much to be dreaded as we are wont to believe, leaving the
system in much healthier condition than most other diseases.’”137
Similarly, “Bernarr Macfadden wrote that the disease was possible only
to those who ‘clothe heavily, bathe infrequently, eat very heartily and

As Kaufman observes, “[s]uch an argument obviously makes one wonder exactly what are the vices and
passions of the cow.” Id.
131. Id. at 472 (quoting H. Lindlahr, 1 Nature Cure Magazine 16–17 (1908)). In a similar vein,
Herbert Spencer claimed that vaccination contributed to “the wholesale syphilization of society.” Id. at
471.
132. Id. at 471–72 (quoting Henry Bergh, The Lancet and the Law, 134 NORTH AM. REV. 163
(1882)).
133. Id. at 472 (citations omitted).
134. Jennifer Keelan et al., YouTube as a Source of Information on Immunization: A Content
Analysis, 298 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2482, 2483 (2007).
135. Kata, supra note 8, at 1711; cf. Bean, supra note 8, at 1877 (76% of websites in the study
sample “asserted that vaccines cause illness, damage, or death,” while 80% of sites asserted that vaccines
contain “poisons”); Davies, Chapman, & Leask, supra note 129, at 24 (93% of sites claim that vaccines
cause various idiopathic illnesses; 83% claim that they are deadly).
136. Wolfe, Sharp, and Lipsky, supra note 129, at 3246.
137. Kaufman, supra note 107, at 475 (quoting J.F. BANTON, VACCINATION REFUTED 3 (1882)).
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exercise rarely.’”138 Some antivaccinationists went so far as to claim that
smallpox was not even contagious, as when Dr. Immenual Pfieffer
“agreed to visit a smallpox hospital in order to prove that the disease was
not infectious.”139
Contemporary antivaccinationists have continued this theme. Some
maintain, for example, that influenza,140 chicken pox,141 and even
measles142 are relatively harmless, or that “natural” immunity resulting
from infection with a disease is “better” than the immunity created by
vaccination.143 Half of the antivaccinationist websites in Kata’s sample
argued that vaccine-preventable diseases are “trivial.”144
b. Competing Claims to Legitimacy Among Rival Epistemic
Communities
The debate over vaccination has been one front in the larger struggle
for power and legitimacy between the mainstream medical community,
represented by the AMA,145 and adherents to various alternative schools
of medical theory.146 Those battle lines were drawn in the nineteenth
century, when opposition to the mainstream medical community’s
consensus in favor of vaccination as a safe and effective preventative
measure provided “irregular” physicians with an opportunity to critique
138. Id. (quoting J.W. HODGE, THE VACCINATION SUPERSTITION 5 (1902)).
139. Id. at 476. Dr. Pfieffer subsequently “was discovered in the throes of a violent smallpox
attack.” Id.
140. See, e.g., Joseph Mercola, Vaccine Alert: New Proof that Flu Shots are Unnecessary and
Ineffective,
MERCOLA.COM
(Nov.
1,
2010),
http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2010/11/01/flu-vaccine-and-its-side-effects.aspx.
141. Joseph Mercola, Despite Doctor’s Order, School Bans Girl for Not Getting Chickenpox
Vaccine,
MERCOLA.COM
(Apr.
23,
2013),
http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2013/04/23/chickenpox-vaccine.aspx
(describing
chicken pox as “a relatively benign childhood illness”).
142. See, e.g., Think Twice, Measles, THINKTWICE.COM, http://thinktwice.com/measles.htm (last
visited Sept. 1, 2019) (claiming that “Prior to the 1960s, most children in the United States and Canada
caught measles. Complications from the disease were unlikely”); Edda West, What If My Child Gets the
Measles?, VACCINE CHOICE CANADA (Nov. 14, 2008), http://vran.org/alternatives/alternatives-forspecific-infections/what-if-my-child-gets-measles/ (describing measles as “an ordinary childhood
disease”).
143. See, e.g., Mercola, supra note 141 (“Unlike the type of immunity acquired from experiencing
the disease, the [chicken pox] vaccine provides only TEMPORARY immunity, and that immunity is not
the same kind of superior, longer lasting immunity you get when you recover naturally from chickenpox”).
144. Kata, supra note 8, at 1712. Indeed, antivaccinationist websites in Kata’s sample argue that
even smallpox was “harmless under proper treatment … [a]nd not considered deadly with the use of
homeopathy.” Id.; see also Davies, Chapman & Leask, supra note 129, at 24 (38% of antivaccinationist
websites claimed that vaccine preventable diseases are “trivial”).
145. Kaufman, supra note 107, at 467. By the late 19th century, the AMA “had become, to the
irregulars, a veritable bogey man trying to deny them the right to earn a living.” Id.
146. Id. at 474 (“Almost every anti-vaccination argument would eventually turn into an attack on
the allopath and his monopoly on medical licensure.”); see also Willrich, supra note 116, at 81.
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the mainstream medical establishment and to challenge its authority as
the exclusive voice of medical expertise.147
The political and commercial significance of the vaccination debate
thus should not be overlooked. Many of the leading actors in the
antivaccinationist movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries had a professional interest in diminishing the credibility of the
mainstream as well as a financial interest in marketing their own
alternative treatments to smallpox. The public debates over vaccination
became something of a proxy war between competing visions of the
medical profession and divergent institutional logics, which were further
associated with disagreements concerning the legitimate role of state
authority in maintaining public health. Kaufman recounts, for example, a
history of the American Medical Liberty League (the “League”), formed
in 1918, which during the course of its existence “opposed vaccination,
medical licensure, isolation of contagious diseases, pure food and drug
laws, the testing of cattle with tuberculin, and a host of other public health
programs.”148 The vice president of the League was Eli G. Jones, “who
had been a practitioner of every medical system, ‘allopathic,
homeopathic, eclectic, physio-medical and biochemical medicine,’”
while the treasurer was D.W. Ensign, “the owner and manager of Ensign
Remedies, a patent medicine mail order house in Battle Creek,
Michigan.”149
In the twenty-first century, the battle for legitimacy continues to rage
between the mainstream and alternative medical practitioners, and the
vaccination debate continues to be a significant point of engagement in
that conflict.150 Modern-day irregulars, including, among others,
chiropractors, 151 homeopaths, and naturopaths,152 continue to challenge
147. Kaufman, supra note 107, at 466–69.
148. Id. at 466.
149. Id. at 467.
150. Outside the context of vaccination, the mainstream medical establishment continues to struggle
for power and legitimacy against a variety of alternative models of medical expertise. See, e.g., Katherine
Beckett & Bruce Hoffman, Challenging Medicine: Law, Resistance, and the Cultural Politics of
Childbirth, 39 L. & SOC. REV. 125 (2005).
151. See Dana Lawrence, Anti-Vaccination Attitudes within the Chiropractic Profession:
Implications for Public Health Ethics, 3 TOP. INTEGR. HEALTH CARE 1 (2012); Margaret L. Russell et al.,
Beliefs and Behaviours: Understanding Chiropractors and Immunization, 23 VACCINE 372 (2004); but
see, e.g., Stephen M. Perle, Vaccines and Public Health, ACA NEWS (2013),
https://www.physics.smu.edu/pseudo/AlternativeMedicine/Vaccines_and_Public_Health.txt (lamenting
the fact that the chiropractic profession’s “philosophical bias toward therapeutic conservatism and
naturalism has not allowed us to see that there is a time and a place for vaccination.”); Robert Cooperstein,
Vaccination Is Both Beyond and Consistent with Chiropractic Philosophy!, 45 J. AM. CHIROPR. ASSOC.
27 (2008).
152. Anne C.C. Lee & Kathi Kemper, Homeopathy and Naturopathy: Practice Characteristics and
Pediatric Care, 154 ARCHIVE OF PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 75, 79 (2000) (“Several reasons have
been postulated for [opposition to vaccination among homeopathic and naturopathic practitioners]: a
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the mainstream medical establishment’s claim of exclusive medical
expertise and to reject the medical establishment’s consensus that
vaccination is a safe and effective means of preventing disease.
Contemporary antivaccinationists, like their forebears, are firmly on the
side of the irregulars, as they commonly recommend methods for the
prevention and cure of disease that are rejected by the mainstream medical
establishment.153 This epistemic divergence goes beyond professional
boundary work to expose a pluralism of epistemological methodology;
38% of antivaccinationist websites in Kata’s content analysis, for
example, promoted “[s]ources of knowledge such as personal intuition …
while biomedical information was portrayed as erroneous; parents were
urged to not to allow biomedical fear-mongering to overshadow their own
instincts.”154
c. Appeals to Liberty
Opponents of mandatory vaccination policies frequently phrase their
appeals in terms of physical or intellectual freedom. In the nineteenth
century, antivaccinationists invoked the specter of human slavery,
analogizing the state’s authority over the bodies of African-American
slaves to its imposition of mandatory vaccination requirements. For
example, nineteenth century British antivaccinationist William Tabb
lamented, upon being required to submit to shipboard vaccination while
in transit to the United States, that “America was closed against the
unvaccinated anti-vaccinator, and that he was fast falling into the
condition of the American negro-slave who was hunted down by
everybody.”155 J.W. Hodge echoed Tabb’s sentiment while speaking
before the Western New York Homeopathic Medical Society, contending
that state-mandated immunization “‘ranks with human slavery and
religious persecution as one of the most flagrant outrages upon the rights
of the human race.’”156
general antipathy with conventional medicine, apprehension of detrimental side effects of immunization,
and the opinion that their own practices provide better, natural protection that ‘obviates the need for
vaccination.’”).
153. Bean, supra note 8, at 1877 (20% of websites “specifically mentioned homeopathy,
chiropractic, or other alternatives to vaccination”); Kata, supra note 8, at 1712 (88% of websites “endorsed
treatments such as herbalism, homeopathy, chiropractics, naturopathy, and acupuncture as superior to
vaccination”); Wolfe, Sharp & Lipsky, supra note 129, at 3247 (70% of websites listed homeopathy as an
alternative to vaccination); Davies, Chapman & Leask, supra note 129, at 24 (45% of websites claimed
that “alternative” health is superior, and 39% claimed that a “natural” lifestyle gives immunity to vaccine
preventable disease).
154. Kata, supra note 8, at 1713.
155. Kaufman, supra note 107, at 466 (quoting WILLIAM TEBB, COMPULSORY VACCINATION IN
ENGLAND 47–50 (1884)).
156. Id. at 473 (quoting J.W. HODGE, THE VACCINATION SUPERSTITION 49 (1902)). Other
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Contemporary antivaccinationists continue to invoke liberty and the
right to bodily autonomy in opposition to state-mandated immunization.
An online petition titled “Universal Declaration of Resistance to
Mandatory Vaccinations,” for example, declares that “as Freemen &
Freewomen … [the petitioners’] bodies are sovereign territory and subject
to our self-determination.”157 Similarly, radio personality Alex Jones’s
website identified the fact that “the government forces us to shoot our kids
full of vaccines” as among the most serious threats to American liberty.158
Indeed, the rhetoric of personal liberty and bodily freedom permeates
throughout antivaccinationist discourse in the twenty-first century, which
depicts vaccine refusal as a matter of individual liberty of conscience
against an overreaching and intrusive public health apparatus.159
d. Religious or Moral Arguments
Antivaccinationists from the nineteenth century to the present day have
also invoked God and morality in their opposition to coerced
immunization. These arguments take several forms. Some argue that
disease and death represent God’s judgment or will and therefore should
be accepted; others contend that the human body’s natural immune
system is divinely created and is defiled by vaccination. Some religious
sects oppose vaccination as a matter of formal doctrine; many
antivaccinationists, however, ground their objection in personal religious
principle even when the religious sect to which they adhere has no formal
opposition to immunization.
Invocations of the divine plan were common to nineteenth century
religious arguments. Antivaccinationists of that era contended either that
arguments appealed to libertarian first principles. Willrich, for example, quotes J.M. Peebles’s declaration
that “upon the constitutional grounds of personal liberty, no vaccination doctor, lancet in one hand and
calf-pox poison in the other, has a legal or moral right to enter the sacred precincts of a healthy home and
scar a child’s body for life.” Willrich, supra note 116, at 82.
157. VACCINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT, A UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF RESISTANCE TO
MANDATORY VACCINATIONS, http://www.thepetitionsite.com/1/a-universal-declaration-of-resistance-tomandatory-vaccinations, (last visited Sept. 1, 2019).
158. Alex Jones, 12 Signs That Americans Who Love Liberty and Freedom Should Watch Their
Backs, INFOWARS.COM (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.infowars.com/12-signs-that-americans-who-loveliberty-and-freedom-should-watch-their-backs.
159. Seventy-five percent of the antivaccinationist websites in Kata’s study argued that mandatory
vaccination was a violation of parental rights, while 63% equated mandatory vaccination with
“totalitarianism.” Kata, supra note 8, at 1712. Half of the websites in Kata’s study “included the notion
of ‘us versus them,’ where concerned parents and vaccine objectors were portrayed as battling physicians,
governments, corporations, or the scientific establishment.” Id. at 1713; see also Bean, supra note 8, at
1877 (44% of antivaccinationist cites referred to civil liberties); Wolfe, Sharp & Lipsky, supra note 129,
at 3247 (77% of antivaccination sites “mentioned civil liberty concerns associated with mandated
vaccination”); Davies, Chapman & Leask, supra note 129, at 24 (86% of sites cast antivaccinationism as
a matter of free and informed choice; 79% compared mandatory vaccination to totalitarianism).
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smallpox was a “social condition” with an environmental solution, or,
adopting the Malthusian perspective influential on much nineteenth
century social thought, argued that “the widening gap between the rich
and the poor was God’s will and that diseases were mechanisms for
controlling the balance between the blessed and the damned.”160 Kaufman
recounts one antivaccinationist tract that involved a parable of God
expelling the physicians from paradise: “Only a return to nature, the Lord
proclaimed, ‘will lead humanity to a more prosperous future.’”161
These themes persist among today’s antivaccinationists. Religious
antivaccinationist Leonard Horowitz, for example, writes that “parents
who elect to forego [the] risks” associated with vaccination, “in
celebration to God and his blessings,” will be rewarded with a “healthy
and natural immunity.”162 Others raise more specific objections, for
example the use of fetal cell lines in the manufacture of some vaccines.163
Religious and moral themes were less common among the
antivaccinationist websites in Kata’s content analyses than the other
themes discussed here, but 25% of the sample contained explicitly
religious advocacy against vaccination, and 38% “assocat[ed] vaccines
with morally dubious actions.”164 Even the Malthusian trappings of
nineteenth-century antivaccinationism, long banished from respectability,
continue to slip covertly into the antivaccinationist worldview. Reich’s
qualitative study of antivaccinationist mothering practices, for example,
finds that many such mothers rely on “imagined gated communities”—
including the scrupulous curation of their child’s social networks to
exclude “unsafe ‘outsiders’ who carry disease”—as a superior alternative
to immunization.165
160. Hodge & Gostin, supra note 104, at 847.
161. Kaufman, supra note 107, at 474 (quoting C. C. SCHIEFFERDECKER, DR. C. G. G. NITTINGER'S
EVILS OF VACCINATION 86–88 (1856)).
162. Leonard
Horowitz,
Vaccination:
The
UnGodly
Practice,
VACINFO.ORG,
http://www.vacinfo.org/uploads/7/9/8/5/79856028/vaccination.pdf; see also Megan Heimer, God Does
Not Support Vaccines, LIVINGWHOLE.ORG (July 7, 2014), http://www.livingwhole.org/god-does-notsupport-vaccines.
163. See, e.g., Donald J. Henz, Infant Immunization: The Catholic Parents’ Guide, CHILDREN OF
GOD FOR LIFE, https://cogforlife.org/catholicguide.pdf (distinguishing “ethical” from “unethical”
vaccines based on the use of human fetal cells in their preparation).
164. Kata, supra note 8, at 1713; see also Wolfe, Sharp & Lipsky, supra note 129, at 3247 (32% of
antivaccinationist websites “raised the fact that viruses grown from cell cultures of aborted fetuses … are
used in” several vaccines). On the other hand, a later content analysis found no reference to explicitly
religious themes among its sample of antivaccinationist websites. Bean, supra note 8, at 1877. The
relative rarity of religious arguments in comparison to empirical or liberty-based objections to vaccination
is striking insofar as, as discussed below, most state statutory exemption schemes require a religious
objection to qualify for exemption from vaccination in the absence of medical contraindication. See infra
Part II(D).
165. Jennifer A. Reich, Neoliberal Mothering and Vaccine Refusal: Imagined Gated Communities
and the Privilege of Choice, 20 GEND. & SOC. 1, 17 (2014).
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e. Conspiracy Theories and Ad Hominem Arguments
As noted above, the vaccination debate can be understood in part as
one battlefield in the larger struggle for legitimacy between the
mainstream and alternative medical communities. It is therefore
unsurprising that one strand of antivaccinationist argument moves beyond
the empirical assessment of vaccines’ safety and medical efficacy to
attack the motives and intentions of vaccination proponents. This line of
argument depicts proponents of vaccination whether physicians who
recommend immunization or pharmaceutical companies that manufacture
and sell vaccines, as not merely factually mistaken about the safety and
utility of vaccination, but as engaged in a conspiracy against public health
for the sake of their own financial interests.166 As Kaufman notes, such
arguments were common in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries:
The Pittsburgh Health Club, for example, which had become a center of
anti-vaccination and anti-allopathic sentiment, published a pamphlet which
stated that in 1924 the local physicians had amassed more than three
million dollars by vaccinating the poor, and to add to their crime, they
caused an epidemic of smallpox to strike the steel city. An American
Medical Liberty League leaflet noted similarly that the vaccinators in
Kansas City had “raked in over half a million dollars” in 1922, and the
author commented that “considering the profits, why should not all medical
doctors advocate vaccination?” Anti-vaccinationists constantly accused
allopaths of starting what they called “vaccination rings,” monopolies of
the regular doctors formed in order to reap the financial benefits of
compulsory vaccinations.167

Contemporary antivaccinationists continue to employ ad hominem
arguments and conspiracy theories alleging that mainstream practitioners
and “Big Pharma” knowingly exaggerate the effectiveness and understate
the risks of vaccines in order to maximize their own wealth.168 Also
common is the allegation of conflict of interest against researchers whose
work on the safety or efficacy of vaccination is funded in part by
pharmaceutical companies. These arguments at times veer into broader
conspiracy theories concerning government control and the intentional
infringement of individual liberties through mandatory immunization
requirements. Dr. Joseph Mercola, for example, decries “Big Pharma[’s]
166. See Willrich, supra note 116, at 81.
167. Kaufman, supra note 107, at 474 (internal citations omitted). Kaufman further quotes Frank
Blue, the secretary of the Anti-Vaccination Society of America, who claimed that “there is nothing so
welcome to the health board of any town as a few cases of smallpox. There is no possible disease that can
be turned into such ready cash; and that yields such perennial returns.” Id. at 475.
168. See, e.g., Markus Heinze, How Pharmaceutical Companies Hide the Dangers of Vaccines from
Parents, VACTRUTH.COM (Sept. 26, 2013), http://vactruth.com/2013/09/26/how-pharmaceutical-hidedangers.
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… lucrative monopoly on health care in America,” through which it has
“managed to steal basic human Constitutional liberties from you,
especially your right to choose what is best for yourself and your children
when it comes to drugs and vaccines.”169 Kata’s study included websites
“staging ad hominem attacks against [Louis] Pasteur, claiming that he
plagiarized [germ] theory,” and lamenting that “[t]oday’s ‘science’ seems
to be much less scrupulous than in earlier times.”170 More broadly, 75%
of the antivaccinationist websites in Kata’s sample asserted that
“vaccination is motivated solely by a quest for profit,” while 63% of the
sites alleged collusion between vaccine manufacturers and physicians,
who profit from vaccines’ harmful side effects.171 Finally, some
antivaccinationists claim that the government itself is conspiring against
their interests. Kirkland, for instance, notes that after their general
causation arguments were soundly rejected in the Omnibus Autism
Proceeding, “losing petitioners and their advocates transformed their
overwhelming loss on the credibility of the science into a case that the
institutional power of government immunization was hopelessly stacked
against them.”172
2. The Autism Controversy: 1998 – Present
The anti-vaccination movement entered its current phase on February
28, 1998, with the publication of a study by Andrew Wakefield et al. in
The Lancet.173 The Wakefield Study purported to identify an association
between receipt of the measles, mumps, and rubella (“MMR”)
vaccination and the development of intestinal inflammation and autism in
169. Joseph Mercola, How Many More of these “Unavoidably Unsafe” Drugs Will Become
(Nov.
5,
2011),
Mandatory?,
MERCOLA.COM
http://articles.mercola.com/sites/articles/archive/2011/11/05/health-liberty-and-forced-vaccination.aspx.
170. Kata, supra note 8, at 1712; see also Wolfe, Sharp, and Lipsky, supra note 129, at 3247 (noting
that “[s]ites advocating homeopathy were often associated with statements attacking Pasteur and the germ
theory of disease”).
171. Id. at 1713; Kata, supra note 8, at 1713; cf. Bean, supra note 8, at 1877 (52% of websites
contained “[a]llegations of vaccination being conducted solely for financial gain or that vaccinations were
promoted by those with conflicts of interest”); Wolfe, Sharp, and Lipsky, supra note 129, at 3247 (91%
of antivaccination sites asserted that “vaccine policy is motivated by profit … which influences universal
vaccination recommendations and promotes the cover-up of vaccine adverse effects”); Davies, Chapman,
and Leask, supra note 129, at 24 (88% of antivaccination sites alleged a “cover up” of the true facts, and
62% alleged that vaccination policy was motivated by an “unholy alliance for profit”).
172. KIRKLAND, supra note 86, at 194; see infra notes 196 to 204 (discussing Omnibus Autism
Proceeding).
173. Andrew Wakefield et al., Ileal-lymphoid-nodular Hyperplasia, Non-Specific Colitis, and
Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 THE LANCET 637 (1998) (retracted Feb. 6, 2010)
[hereinafter the “Wakefield Study”]. Dr. Wakefield was also an author in a second study published in
2002, which purported to identify a correlation between autism diagnosis and the presence of the measles
virus genome in intestinal biopsy tissue. V. Uhlmann et al., Potential Viral Pathogenic Mechanism for
New Variant Inflammatory Bowel Disease, 55 MOL. PATHOL. 84 (2002).
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children. In a time of rising and unexplained autism diagnosis,174 the study
claimed that parents and the medical establishment were inflicting
neurological disorder upon infants by injecting them with pathogens and
“toxins” in vaccines. This claim preyed upon parents’ anxieties for their
children’s health and the public’s fears about the obscure and at times
sinister-sounding contents of some vaccines, particularly MMR.
While the Wakefield Study immediately captured the attention of the
public and the popular press, the mainstream medical community was
skeptical that childhood vaccination was a causal agent in the
development of autism.
Subsequent studies called Wakefield’s
175
and 10 of the study’s 12 co-authors
conclusions into question,
disavowed its claimed causal association between MMR and autism.176
Numerous studies failed to replicate the finding of an association between
immunization and autism.177 Taken together, these replication studies
establish almost conclusively that childhood vaccination does not cause
autism.
As the medical community directed its initial criticism toward the
Wakefield Study’s flawed methodology and the irreproducibility of its
results, allegations of fraud and conflicts of interest against Wakefield
personally began to surface in the mainstream press. Beginning in 2004
and continuing through 2012, the London Times ran a series of articles
identifying a number of ethical conflicts and lapses in the conduct and
reporting of the Wakefield Study.178 The investigation discovered, for
example, that Wakefield failed to disclose that the study was funded by
lawyers representing a group of parents who believed their children’s
autism had been caused by the MMR vaccine or that Wakefield himself
was in the process of patenting a separate measles vaccine that would
compete with MMR.179 Contrary to his assurances to the research
oversight board, Wakefield ordered a number of tests—including
174. See Irva Hertz-Picciotto & Lora Delwiche, The Rise in Autism and the Role of Age at
Diagnosis, 20 EPIDEMIOLOGY 84 (2009).
175. See, e.g., L. Dales et al., Time Trends in Autism and in MMR Immunization Coverage in
California; 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1183 (2001); B. Taylor et al., Autism and Measles, Mumps, and
Rubella Vaccine: No Epidemiological Evidence for a Causal Association, 353 THE LANCET 2026 (1999).
176. S.H. Murch et al., Retraction of an Interpretation, 363 THE LANCET 750 (2004).
177. See Luke E. Taylor, Amy L. Swerdfeger & Guy D. Eslick, Vaccines are not Associated with
Autism: An Evidence-Based Meta-Analysis of Case-Control and Cohort Studies, 32 VACCINE 3623
(2014); D.A. Gust et al., Underimmunization Among Children: Effects of Vaccine Safety Concerns on
Immunization Status, 114 PEDIATRICS 16 (2004); see generally Vaccines & Autism, SCIENCE-BASED
MEDICINE, https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/reference/vaccines-and-autism (last visited Sept. 1, 2019)
(summarizing key research).
178. See generally Brian Deer, Andrew Wakefield – the Fraud Investigation, BRIANDEER.COM,
http://briandeer.com/mmr-lancet.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2019) (providing links to all articles and
overview of underlying research).
179. Brian Deer, How Lawyers Paid for Vaccine Research, BRIANDEER.COM,
http://briandeer.com/wakefield/wakefield-deal.htm.
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colonoscopies and lumbar punctures (i.e., spinal taps)—on child test
subjects that were not medically necessary.180 The Lancet formally
retracted the Wakefield Study in 2010, writing that “it has become clear
that several elements of the 1998 paper by Wakefield et al. are
incorrect.”181 The Times investigation’s revelations eventually led the
British General Medical Council (“GMC”) to hold a 217-day “Fitness to
Practise” hearing regarding allegations of unethical practices undertaken
in connection with the Wakefield Study, which concluded with the
revocation of Wakefield’s license to practice medicine in the United
Kingdom.182 The GMC wrote that it “is profoundly concerned that Dr
Wakefield repeatedly breached fundamental principles of research
medicine.”183 At the same time the GMC hearing was proceeding, the
Sunday Times and the British Medical Journal published additional
allegations of fraud against the Wakefield Study.184 Wakefield eventually
relocated to Texas and filed a number of libel suits against the journalists
who had reported the fraud, all of which were eventually dismissed.185
Notwithstanding the scientific community’s rejection of the Wakefield
Study’s hypothesized connection between MMR vaccination and autism,
the claim was widely adopted by the antivaccination movement and
worked its way into popular consciousness.186 Since 1998, that claim has
been repeated in blog posts,187 television reporting, and alternative
180. GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, DETERMINATION ON SERIOUS PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
(SPM)
AND
SANCTION
4
(May
24,
2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20110809092833/http://www.gmcuk.org/Wakefield_SPM_and_SANCTION.pdf_32595267.pdf.
181. The Editors of The Lancet, Retraction—Ileal-lymphoid-nodular Hyperplasia, Non-specific
Colitis, and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 375 THE LANCET 445 (2010)
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(10)60175-4/fulltext
(footnote
omitted).
182. GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL, supra note 180, at 4.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Brian Deer, Wakefield’s “Autistic Enterocolitis” under the Microscope, 340 BRITISH
MED. J. 340 (2010); Brian Deer, MMR Doctor Fixed Data on Autism, SUNDAY TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009; see
generally Brian Deer, The Award-Winning Sunday Times and BMJ Reports, BRIANDEER.COM,
http://briandeer.com/mmr/st-mmr-reports.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2019) (chronology of Sunday Times
and British Medical Journal articles); see also F. Godlee, J. Smith & H. Marcovitch, Wakefield’s Article
Linking MMR Vaccine and Autism Was Fraudulent, 342 BRITISH MED. J. 7452 (2011) (describing the
Wakefield Study as “fraudulent”).
185. Wakefield v. Channel Four Television Corp., [2005] EWHC 2410 (QB) (2005); Wakefield v.
British Med. J. Pub. Group, Ltd., 449 S.W.3d 172, 189 (Tex. App. 2014) (affirming dismissal for lack of
personal jurisdiction).
186. See Allison Kennedy et al., Confidence about Vaccines in the United States: Understanding
Parents’ Perceptions, 30 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1151 (2011).
187. See, e.g., David Kirby, THE AUTISM-VACCINE DEBATE: WHY IT WON’T GO AWAY
POST
(2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-kirby/autism-vaccineHUFFINGTON
_b_817879.html; Leo Rebello, Vaccines: Untested, Unsafe and Unnecessary, HPATHY.COM (Nov. 17,
2008), http://hpathy.com/homeopathy-papers/vaccines-untested-unsafe-and-unnecessary (asserting that
“doctors watched perfectly normal children turn into grotesque zombies after receiving the [MMR]
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medical news sources.188 Although the mainstream press has generally
rejected the claims of antivaccinationists,189 the contemporary
antivaccination movement has enjoyed considerable public support from

vaccines . . . .”).
188. See, e.g., Sarah Pope, Two Autistic Children Awarded Millions by Vaccine Court , THE
HEALTHY HOME ECONOMIST (Jan. 16, 2013), http://experimentalvaccines.blogspot.com/2013/04/twoautistic-children-awarded-millions.html; Sarah Pope, Baby Dies after Routine Vaccination for Hep B,
Polio,
and
DPT,
THE
HEALTHY
HOME
ECONOMIST
(March
19,
2013),
https://www.sagaciousnewsnetwork.com/baby-dies-after-routine-vaccination-for-hep-b-polio-and-dpt/;
Jonathan Benson, Breaking: Courts Discreetly Confirm MMR Vaccine Causes Autism, NATURAL NEWS
(Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.naturalnews.com/041897_MMR_vaccines_autism_court_ruling.html; Arjun
Walla, Scientific Evidence Suggests The Vaccine-Autism Link Can No Longer Be Ignored, COLLECTIVE
EVOLUTION (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.collective-evolution.com/2013/09/12/22-medical-studies-thatshow-vaccines-can-cause-autism.
189. See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor, Anti-Vaccine Movement is Giving Diseases a 2nd Life, USA
TODAY, Apr. 8, 2014; Richard Conniff, A Forgotten Pioneer of Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2013, at
D1; Seth Berkley, Opinion, Stick With the Science, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE (Jan. 17, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/opinion/global/a-blanket-mercury-bank-would-block-neededvaccinations.html; Liz Szabo, Full Vaccine Schedule Safe for Kids, No Link to Autism, USA TODAY, Mar.
29, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/29/vaccine-schedule-autism/2026617/;
Sabrina Tavernise, Vaccine Rule Is Said to Hurt Health Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, at A4; Sandra
G. Boodman, Inside the Vaccine-Autism Scare, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2011, at B01; Editorial, The Autism
Vaccine Hoax; A Tragic Scare Campaign is Exposed as “Fraud,” WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2011, at A12;
Editorial, Vaccines Exonerated on Autism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A30.
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entertainment celebrities,190 talk show hosts,191 and politicians.192
190. Prominent celebrity antivaccinationists include Jim Carrey, Rob Schneider, and Dr. Mayim
Bialik. See, e.g., Rob Schneider Speaks Out on Vaccination Rights in Canadian Mag, AGE OF AUTISM
(May 7, 2013), http://www.ageofautism.com/2013/05/rob-schneider-speaks-out-on-vaccination-rightsin-canadian-mag.html; Jim Carrey, The Judgment on Vaccines Is In???, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17,
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jim-carrey/the-judgment-on-vaccines_b_189777.html; Kristin
Cavallari, Mayim Bialik Talks Attachment Parenting with CBB, PEOPLE.COM (June 4, 2009),
http://celebritybabies.people.com/2009/06/04/mayim-bialik-talks-attachment-parenting-with-cbb.
In
2016, Robert De Niro stirred controversy by agreeing to screen, and subsequently withdrawing, the proWakefield documentary film Vaxxed at the 2016 TriBeCa Film Festival. See Melena Ryzik, Anti-Vaccine
Film, Pulled From Tribeca Film Festival, Draws Crowd at Showing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2016, at A14.
Perhaps most outspoken among celebrity antivaccinationists has been Jenny McCarthy, whose son was
diagnosed with autism in 2005. See Jenny McCarthy, The Day I Heard My Son Had Autism, CNN.COM
(Sept. 24, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/24/jenny.autism. McCarthy became a prominent
spokesperson for the antivaccination movement, authoring several books promoting her belief that her
son’s autism was caused by the MMR vaccine and that his condition was “cured” by natural remedies.
See ANDREW J. WAKEFIELD & JENNY MCCARTHY, CALLOUS DISREGARD: AUTISM AND VACCINES—THE
TRUTH BEHIND A TRAGEDY (2011); JENNY MCCARTHY & JERRY KARTZINEL, HEALING AND
PREVENTING AUTISM: A COMPLETE GUIDE (2010); JENNY MCCARTHY, MOTHER WARRIORS: A NATION
OF PARENTS HEALING AUTISM AGAINST ALL ODDS (2008) [hereinafter “MOTHER WARRIORS”]; JENNY
MCCARTHY, LOUDER THAN WORDS: A MOTHER’S JOURNEY IN HEALING AUTISM (2007).
191. See, e.g., Bill Maher, Vaccination: A Conversation Worth Having, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
17,
2011),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bill-maher/vaccination-a-conversatio_b_358578.html.
Similarly, activist Robert Kennedy, Jr., asserted in a 2005 article that the government had conspired with
the pharmaceutical industry to conceal the risks of thimerosal, a mercury-containing preservative that had
been used in vaccines since the 1930s. See Robert Kennedy, Jr., Deadly Immunity, ROLLING STONE, July
14, 2005; see also ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THIMEROSAL: LET THE SCIENCE SPEAK (revised ed. 2015);
but see Seth Mnookin, How Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Distorted Vaccine Science, SCI. AM. (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-robert-f-kennedy-jr-distorted-vaccine-science1.
192. In a September 2015 debate between candidates for the Republican presidential nomination,
Donald Trump suggested that vaccination causes autism. Amanda Marcotte, Donald Trump Uses GOP
Debate
to
Push
Anti-Vaccination
Myths,
SLATE
(Sept.
16,
2015),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/09/16/donald_trump_suggested_vaccines_cause_autism_du
ring_the_cnn_gop_debate_he.html; see also CNN Political Unit, Trump Weighs in on Vaccine-Autism
Controversy, POLITICAL TICKER (Mar. 28, 2014), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/28/trumpweighs-in-on-vaccine-autism-controversy (quoting Donald Trump’s statement on Twitter that “[i]f I were
President I would push for proper vaccinations but would not allow one time massive shots that a small
child cannot take – AUTISM”). In 2017, Robert Kennedy, Jr., claimed that President-elect Trump
intended to appoint him to chair a presidential commission on the relationship between vaccination and
autism. Abby Philip, Lena H. Sun & Lenny Bernstein, Vaccine Skeptic Robert Kennedy Jr. Says Trump
Asked Him to Lead Commission on ‘Vaccine Safety,’ WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-meet-with-proponent-of-debunked-tie-betweenvaccines-and-autism/2017/01/10/4a5d03c0-d752-11e6-9f9f-5cdb4b7f8dd7_story.html.
Trump’s
spokesperson denied that any decision had been made, and no such commission has yet been created.
Amber Jamieson, Trump Team Denies New Vaccination Commission after Kennedy Claims Post, THE
GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/10/vaccination-safetyrobert-kennedy-jr-chair-commission-trump; see David Smith, Trump Appears to Abandon Vaccine
Sceptic
Group
Denounced
by
Scientists,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Feb.
21,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/feb/21/trump-vaccination-safety-commission-robertkennedy-autism. President Trump has subsequently encouraged parents to comply with vaccination
requirements. See Nathaniel Weixel, Health Officials Warn Measles Could Regain Foothold If Record
Outbreaks Are Not Contained, THE HILL (Apr. 29, 2019 11:20 AM) (quoting President Trump as stating
that children “have to get their [MMR] shots”), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/441140-healthofficials-warn-measles-could-regain-foothold-if-record-outbreaks-are. Democratic presidential candidate
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For all their popular appeal, claims of a causal connection between
vaccination and autism have been soundly rejected by the federal courts.
Under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program as established
by the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,193 claims of
vaccine injury are heard by special masters in the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims, popularly known as the “Vaccine Court.”194 Successful claims of
vaccine injury are paid from a fund established by excise taxes on every
vaccine purchase, rather than directly from vaccine manufacturers.195 In
the years after the Wakefield Study was published, over 5,000 petitioners
filed claims of vaccine-caused autism with the Vaccine Court. In 2002,
the Vaccine Court consolidated those claims into a single proceeding
known as the Omnibus Autism Proceeding (“OAP”).196
Throughout the OAP litigation, the petitioners asserted two theories of
general causation: first, that the combination of the MMR vaccine and
other vaccines containing thimerosal, a mercury-based preservative that
at the time was used in some vaccines (but not MMR),197 compromised
the immune systems of some children such that the measles virus present
in MMR was able to survive in their bodies, causing autism (the “Phase
1” theory); second, that thimerosal-containing vaccines alone caused

Marianne Williamson has described mandatory vaccination as “draconian” and “Orwellian,” but
subsequently apologized for having “misspoke[n].” Matt Stieb, Where Does Marianne Williamson
Actually Stand on Vaccines?, NEW YORK (Aug. 4, 2019), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/08/wheredoes-marianne-williamson-actually-stand-on-vaccines.html. Dan Burton (R-IN) was a vocal advocate of
the link between vaccination and autism during his tenure in Congress. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris &
Anahad O’Connor, On Autism’s Cause, It’s Parents vs. Research, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at A2,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/25/science/25autism.html; Philip J. Hilts, House Panel Asks for Study
of a Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2000, at A4, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/07/us/house-panel-asksfor-study-of-a-vaccine.html. Representative Michele Bachmann (R-MN) similarly suggested that the
human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine may cause intellectual disability. See e.g., Rachel Weiner,
Bachmann Claims HPV Vaccine Might Cause “Mental Retardation,” WASH. POST, (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/michele-bachmann-continues-perry-attack-claimshpv-vaccine-might-cause-mental-retardation/2011/09/13/gIQAbJBcPK_blog.html;
Denise
Grady,
Remark on HPV Vaccine Could Ripple for Years, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/health/20hpv.html. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) introduced legislation
to direct the CDC to study the vaccine-autism link, before ultimately concluding in 2018 that vaccines do
not cause autism. See Carl Campanile, Maloney Backs Away from Questioning If Vaccines Cause Autism,
N.Y. POST (Mar. 18, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/03/11/maloney-no-longer-believes-vaccines-causeautism; Curtis Brainerd. Sticking with the Truth, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (2013),
https://archives.cjr.org/feature/sticking_with_the_truth.php (describing Maloney’s proposed legislation).
193. Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34).
194. See generally KIRKLAND, supra note 86.
195. Id. at 65–96.
196. Id. at 172–98.
197. Thimerosal was eliminated from all vaccines used in the United States as of 2001. Its
elimination did not affect the rate of autism diagnosis. See Robert Schechter & Judith K. Grether,
Continuing Increases in Autism Reported to California’s Developmental Services System: Mercury in
GEN.
PSYCH.
19
(2008),
Retrograde,
65
ARCH.
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapsychiatry/fullarticle/482546.
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autism by causing neuroinflammation (the “Phase 2” theory).198
Petitioners’ counsel identified three test cases for each theory, and trials
in those cases were held on the issue of general causation, with the
agreement that the results of those trials would have issue preclusive
effect on the other pending claims.199 After multi-day hearings in the test
cases, both of petitioners’ theories of general causation were soundly
rejected. The special master in Cedillo wrote that the government’s
experts were “far better qualified, far more experienced, and far more
persuasive than petitioners’ experts concerning most of the key points,”
and that the petitioners “failed to demonstrate that [Michelle Cedillo’s]
vaccinations played any role at all in causing [her autism and other
medical problems].”200 Having failed to establish general causation in the
test cases, the remaining OAP petitioners’ claims were dismissed.201
The OAP litigation settled the question of vaccines and autism for legal
purposes, but the debate rages on in the public sphere. Antivaccinationist
advocacy appears to have influenced public opinion to a significant
degree.202 A 2009 survey showed that 25% of parents surveyed believed
that “[s]ome vaccines cause autism in healthy children.”203 Increased
concern about the safety and efficacy of vaccination within some
segments of the public has led to substantial declines in immunization
uptake among children,204 which are believed to have contributed to
198. KIRKLAND, supra note 86, at 174-75, 180–85.
199. Id. at 173–74; see Cedillo v. HHS, No. 98-916v (Fed. Cl. 2009) (Phase 1); Hazlehurst v. HHS,
No. No. 03-654V, (Fed. Cl. filed Mar. 26, 2003) (Phase 1); Snyder v. HHS, No. 01-162V (Fed. Cl. filed
Mar. 22, 2001) (Phase 1); Mead v. HHS, No. 03-215V (Fed. Cl. filed Jan. 29, 2003) (Phase 2); King ex
rel. King v. HHS, No. 03-584V (Fed.Cl. filed Mar. 14, 2003) (Phase 2); Dwyer v. HHS, No. 03-1202V
(Fed. Cl. filed May. 14, 2003) (Phase 2).
200. Cedillo v. HHS., No. 98-916V, 89 Fed. Cl. 158, 164 (Fed. Cl. 2009); see also
King v. HHS., No. 03-584V, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 88, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 12, 2010) (reaching the
same conclusions as to the Phase 2 theory of causation).
201. KIRKLAND, supra note 86, at 193–95.
202. L. Mercer et al., Parental Perspectives on the Causes of an Autism Spectrum Disorder in Their
Children, 15 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 41 (2006).
203. Gary L. Freed et al., Parental Vaccine Safety Concerns in 2009, 1962 PEDIATRICS 656 (2010).
More recent data regarding public opinion on the autism question specifically do not appear to exist.
However, recent data on general public opinion concerning the safety and efficacy of vaccines are
consistent with Freed et al.’s results. A 2017 Pew Research Center study for that 66% of Americans rated
the risk of vaccine side effects as “low,” and 82% agreed that “healthy children should be required to be
vaccinated.” PEW RESEARCH CENTER, VAST MAJORITY OF AMERICANS SAY BENEFITS OF VACCINES
OUTWEIGH RISKS 4 (2017). These general statistics obscure a more complicated story with respect to
parents of young children, however. Only 52% of parents of children aged 0-4 rated the risk of vaccine
side effects as “low,” and 22% of such parents said that “parents should be able to decide not to vaccinate
their children, even if that may create health risks for others.” Id. at 5.
204. See Jason M. Glanz et al., A Population-Based Cohort Study of Undervaccination in 8
Managed Care Organizations Across the United States, 167 JAMA PEDIATRICS 274, 278–80 (2013) (49%
of a sample drawn from 2004-2008 birth cohorts was undervaccinated, at least 13% of whom were
undervaccinated due to parental choice; trend of undervaccination is increasing); Saad B. Omer et al.,
Vaccination Policies and Rates of Exemption from Immunization, 2005–2011, 367 NEW ENGL. J. MED.
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recent resurgences in vaccine-preventable diseases.205 In 2019, the World
Health Organization named “vaccine hesitancy” as one of the top ten
global health threats, writing that “[v]accination is one of the most costeffective ways of avoiding disease – it currently prevents 2-3 million
deaths a year, and a further 1.5 million could be avoided if global
coverage of vaccinations improved.”206
C. Judicial Responses to Legal Challenges to Mandatory Vaccination
Policies
Mandatory vaccination policies proved controversial from an early
stage, and lawsuits challenging vaccination requirements on
constitutional and common-law grounds have been a feature of public
health law since the nineteenth century.207 The most significant feature of
the body of law addressing these claims is that courts—state and federal,
regardless of time or place—have uniformly upheld the government’s
right to impose vaccination requirements in the name of public health, and
have generally rejected claims of constitutional or other rights against
compliance with such policies, whether grounded in normative or
epistemic pluralism.
A survey of judicial responses to legal challenges to mandatory
vaccination policies over the twentieth century reveals two themes that
recur frequently in courts’ adjudication of individual rights-based
objections to mandatory vaccination policies. The first of these is an
emphasis, somewhat at odds with the dominant strain of libertarian
individualism in American politics,208 on the authority of the state to
impose obligations on individuals to achieve some communal benefit.
Second, courts almost uniformly defer to legislative or municipal
expertise and consistently refuse to entertain challenges to the empirical
1170, 1171 (2012) (concluding that “nonmedical exemptions have continued to increase, and the rate of
increase has accelerated”); Saad B. Omer et al., Nonmedical Exemptions to School Immunization
Requirements: Secular Trends and Association of State Policies with Pertussis Incidence, 296 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1757 (2006).
205. Varun K. Phadke et al., Association Between Vaccine Refusal and Vaccine-Preventable
Diseases in the United States: A Review of Measles and Pertussis, 315 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1149 (2016)
(ascribing outbreaks of measles and pertussis to antivaccinationism); van Panhuis et al., supra note 111,
at 2157 (linking outbreaks of vaccine-preventable disease to low vaccination rates).
206. World Health Organization, Ten Threats to Global Health in 2019,
https://www.who.int/emergencies/ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019 (last visited Sept. 2, 2019).
207. The first recorded case challenging a municipal vaccination policy was Hazen v. Strong, 2 Vt.
427 (1830), in which the Vermont Supreme Court upheld a municipality’s authority to impose an
assessment to support smallpox vaccination even in the absence of reported cases of smallpox. The earliest
case addressing a challenge to a mandatory vaccination policy appears to be Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226
(1890), which held a state statute excluding unvaccinated children from public schools to be a
constitutional exercise of the state police power.
208. See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955).
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bases of a mandatory vaccination policy. Empirical disagreements are
consistently resolved in favor of the state and its designated public health
experts; individuals’ rejection of those experts’ consensus that vaccines
are safe and effective at preventing disease is typically regarded by courts
as irrational and illegitimate, or at least undeserving of judicial validation.
This section will explore both of these themes in the body of judicial
decisions addressing challenges to mandatory vaccination policies in the
twentieth century, beginning with the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.209 While it was neither the first nor the last
case to address a constitutional challenge to mandatory vaccination,
Jacobson set the tone for the next century of litigation on this issue by
articulating a broad view of the state’s power to preserve public health
through mandatory immunization.
The Jacobson case began with a smallpox outbreak in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, in 1902. On February 27 of that year, the city’s board of
health adopted a resolution requiring all residents “who have not been
successfully vaccinated since March 1st, 1897, to be vaccinated or
revaccinated.”210 The statute delegating authority to the board of health to
adopt a vaccination requirement also prescribed a fine of five dollars for
refusal to comply.211 One such refusal was by the Reverend Henning
Jacobson, a Swedish immigrant and pastor of a Lutheran church in
Cambridge.212 Jacobson, who claimed to have suffered a severe illness
from a previous vaccination and to have witnessed a similar reaction in
his son,213 refused to comply with the vaccination ordinance and was
charged with violating the applicable statute. At trial, Jacobson made 14
offers of proof, seeking to introduce facts pertaining to the purported lack
of safety or effectiveness of the smallpox vaccine generally as well as his
and his son’s prior adverse reactions to vaccination.214 The trial court
rejected each of Jacobson’s offers of proof, and Jacobson was convicted
and sentenced to pay the $5 fine.215 On appeal, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Jacobson’s conviction and rejected his
constitutional challenges the statute empowering the board of health to
impose the requirement.216
Jacobson appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting a number of
constitutional objections. Most significantly, he claimed that the
209.
210.
211.
212.

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
JAMES KEITH COLGROVE, STATE OF IMMUNITY: THE POLITICS OF VACCINATION IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 38–39 (2006).
213. Id. at 40; see also Willrich, supra note 116, at 88.
214. COLGROVE, supra note 212, at 40.
215. Id.
216. Massachusetts v. Jacobson, 183 Mass. 242 (1903); see COLGROVE, supra note 212, at 38–39.
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mandatory vaccination requirement constituted “an assault upon his
person” in violation of the “right of every freeman to care for his own
body and health in such way as to him seems best,” as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and Immunities, Due Process, and
Equal Protection Clauses.217 In a 7-2 decision, the Court rejected
Jacobson’s constitutional claims and affirmed that the state’s police
power included the authority to impose vaccination requirements in the
name of public health.
Particularly in light of the historical moment in which it was decided,218
Jacobson’s vision of the state’s authority to regulate private behavior for
the sake of a public benefit is striking. The decision does not so much
deny the existence of a right of “every freeman” to bodily autonomy as
simply state that any such right, if it exists, is subordinate to the right of
the community to protect itself against threats to public health. In a
jurisprudential era best remembered as hostile to governmental regulation
of private conduct,219 the Court’s language in Jacobson is remarkable for
its conception of the broad power of the state to impose immunization
obligations for the purpose of preserving public health and safety, without
regard to the rights-based objections of individual dissenters.220 The Court
presented this sublimation of individual liberty claims to common interest
as a practical necessity of governance and a bulwark against anarchy:
There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject
for the common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist
with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law
unto himself would soon be confronted with disaster and anarchy. Real
liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which
recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in
respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be

217. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
218. The Court’s decision in Jacobson was issued about two months before its decision in Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which invalidated a New York state law limiting the number of hours
that bakers were permitted to work. The distribution of votes in Jacobson and Lochner illustrates the
tension between the two decisions’ visions of the scope of the state police power to enact regulations in
furtherance of public health and welfare. Justice Peckham, one of the two dissenters in Jacobson, was the
author of the Court’s decision in Lochner, in which Justice Brewer, the other Jacobson dissenter, joined.
Justices Harlan and Holmes, both members of the majority in Jacobson, dissented separately in Lochner,
each citing Jacobson in support of his argument that Lochner was wrongly decided. 198 U.S. at 75
(Holmes, J., dissenting), 78 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
219. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918); see generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36
VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
220. The Court noted, for example, that “it was the duty of the constituted authorities primarily to
keep in view the welfare, comfort, and safety of the many, and not permit the interests of the many to be
subordinated to the wishes or convenience of the few.” Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 29.
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done to others.221

The Court’s response to the petitioner’s challenge to the prevailing
medical consensus is a model of deference to expert consensus over
individual dissent. The Court rejected the petitioner’s offers of proof that
some medical professionals doubted the safety or efficacy of the smallpox
vaccine, observing that “an opposite theory accords with the common
belief, and is maintained by high medical authority.”222 Choosing between
competing theories of epidemiology, the Court concluded, was a matter
for legislative rather than judicial expertise.223
Jacobson’s prioritization of communal welfare over individual rights
claims has remained a consistent theme of judicial analyses of mandatory
vaccination requirements even as rights-based notions of bodily
autonomy and informed consent224 gained broader influence during the
20th century.225 This theme of judicial deference to legislative expertise
on disputed empirical questions concerning the safety or efficacy of
vaccinations is nearly universal throughout the body of case law
concerning legal challenges to mandatory vaccination policies.226
Although the petitioner in Jacobson did not present a Free Exercise claim
or rely significantly on religious or philosophical objections in support of
221. Id. at 26.
222. Id. at 30.
223. Id. (“It is no part of the function of a court or a jury to determine which one of two modes was
likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public against disease. That was for the legislative
department to determine in the light of all the information it had or could obtain.”).
224. See, e.g., Michael H. Shapiro, Updating Constitutional Doctrine: An Extended Response to the
Critique of Compulsory Vaccination, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 87 (2012); Kristine M.
Severyn, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Impact on Informed Consent and Vaccine Policy, 5 J. PHARM. L
249, 255–56 (1995).
225. We should not gloss over the fact that the coercive medical invasion of the body authorized by
Jacobson raises vexing problems of bioethics and individual bodily autonomy. Justice Holmes’s flippant
statement that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough,” in the context of affirming the
constitutionality of coercive sterilization of the “unfit,” is rightly held among the more infamous
utterances of twentieth-century jurisprudence. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927); see ADAM COHEN,
IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS, AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK
(2016) (noting that neither Carrie Buck nor her mother or daughter met the then-prevailing medical
definition of “imbecile”). Less widely quoted is the sentence immediately preceding that pronouncement:
“The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.”
Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25).
226. See, e.g., Rempfer v. Von Eschenbach, 535 F. Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 2008) (deferring to FDA’s
determination that the vaccine in question was effective for immunization against anthrax); Mosier v.
Barren County Bd. of Health, 308 Ky. 829 (1948) (deferring to “health authorities[’]” expertise over the
“whims of laymen”); In re Whitmore, 47 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145 (1944) (“In a democracy laws are not made
to meet the predilections of individuals, nor to feed mistaken views which an individual might hold, when
that view is detrimental to the people as a whole.”); Vonnegut v. Baun, 206 Ind. 172 (1934) (conclusion
of board of health that epidemic existed is binding absent fraud or bad faith); Cram v. School Board of
Manchester, 82 N.H. 495, 497 (1927) (noting that it is “not for the court to inquire into the wisdom or
unwisdom of” a mandatory vaccination requirement); Viemeister v. White, 179 N.Y. 235 (1904)
(upholding statute requiring vaccination for public school attendance).
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his claim for a constitutional exemption, such claims have fared no better
before other courts than did the empirical objections in Jacobson.227 In
short, courts have generally recognized neither normative nor empirical
objections to vaccination as establishing individual rights, constitutional
or otherwise, against mandatory immunizations, and have deferred to
legislative and, later, agency expertise in crafting public health policies
including mandatory vaccinations.228
The expansion of constitutional theories in the post-Jacobson era has
made no difference in the prospects of antivaccinationist plaintiffs—
courts routinely uphold mandatory vaccination requirements as
constitutional exercises of the state police power, often explicitly
invoking a principle of epistemic deference to legislative factfinding.229
The Second Circuit’s decision in Phillips v. City of New York is
illustrative of the modern era of vaccine litigation.230 In a consolidated
action, the plaintiffs challenged the state’s statutory and regulatory
vaccination requirements on several constitutional grounds—most
notably the Free Exercise Clause, the substantive component of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause. The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgments in favor
of the defendants, holding the vaccination requirements constitutional
under all theories. The court invoked Jacobson to deny the plaintiffs’
substantive due process claim, including, crucially, Jacobson’s principle
of judicial epistemic deference. Though the plaintiffs argued that “a

227. See, e.g., Workman v. Mingo County Bd. of Educ., 419 F. App’x 348 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting
Free Exercise challenge to immunization requirement for public school attendance); U.S. v. Chadwell, 36
C.M.R. 741 (1965) (upholding mandatory troop vaccination against religious objections); see also Prince
v. United States, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1957) (“The right to practice religion freely does not include
liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”).
228. See, e.g., Caviezel v. Great Neck Pub. Sch., 500 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order)
(denying substantive due process challenge to mandatory vaccination requirement). Litigants challenging
mandatory immunization requirements have succeeded only in the narrow class of cases in which courts
have held that the agency that enacted the challenged provision lacked statutory authority to do so. See
Burroughs v. Mortenson, 312 Ill. 163 (1924) (board of education lacked authority to adopt mandatory
vaccination requirement); Rhea v. Bd. of Educ. of Devils Lake Sp. Sch. Dist., 41 N.D. 449 (1919) (same);
cf. Pierce v. Board of Educ. of City of Fulton, 30 Misc.2d 1039 (N.Y. Sup. 1961) (school board had
authority to adopt requirement); State ex rel. Dunham v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of Cincinnati,
154 Ohio St. 469 (1951) (same).
229. In addition to the cases cited supra notes 226–228, litigation against California’s S.B. 277 has
been a significant locus of antivaccinationist effort in recent years. The law has been uniformly upheld
against state and federal constitutional attack by every court to consider the issue. See Love v. Dep’t of
Educ., No. C086030, 2018 WL 6382089, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2018) (slip op.) (upholding S.B. 277
under state constitution); Brown v. Smith, 24 Cal. App. 5th 1135 (2d Dist. 2018) (same); Middleton v.
Pan, No. CV 16–5224–SVW (AGR), 2017 WL 7053936 (Dec. 18, 2017) (Rosenberg, Mag.), adopted,
2018 WL 582324 (Jan. 25, 2018) (dismissing claims against several state official defendants arising from
enactment and enforcement of S.B. 277); Whitlow v. California, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1079 (S.D. Cal. 2016)
(denying motion for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of S.B. 277).
230. 775 F.3d 538 (2d Cir. 2015).
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growing body of scientific evidence demonstrates that vaccines cause
more harm to society than good,” the court held that “that is a
determination for the legislature, not the individual objectors.”231 Turning
to the Free Exercise issue, the Second Circuit acknowledged that
Jacobson did not directly address the question, but applied the logic of
Jacobson and the Court’s dicta in Prince to hold that “mandatory
vaccination as a condition for admission to school does not violate the
Free Exercise Clause.”232 The court then briefly addressed the plaintiffs’
Equal Protection arguments, finding no basis for a claim that the state
vaccination regime discriminated against Catholics or that any plaintiff
was treated differently than similarly situated parents.233
D. Legislative Accommodation of Normative Pluralism
While courts have resoundingly rejected their claims for exemptions
grounded in legal right, antivaccinationists have enjoyed a greater
measure of success before state legislatures. Such success, however, has
been completely restricted to objections grounded in normative rather
than epistemic pluralism.234 Antivaccination advocates have had
significant success in obtaining exemptions grounded in religious or
philosophical objections to immunization.235 Forty-five states allow
religious exceptions to mandatory vaccination policies,236 and 15 states
allow exceptions for non-religious “philosophical” objections.237 No
state, however, provides exemptions from mandatory vaccination policies
on the grounds of empirical disagreement with the medical or scientific

231. Id. at 542 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 37–38).
232. Id. at 543 (citing Prince v. New York, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67); see supra note 230.
233. Phillips, 775 F.3d at 543–44.
234. Every state provides exemptions for medical contraindication, which reflect accommodation
of neither normative nor epistemic pluralism.
235. See Linda E. LeFever, Religious Exemptions from School Immunization: A Sincere Belief or a
Legal Loophole?, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 1047 (2006).
236. The exceptions are West Virginia, Mississippi, California, New York, and Maine. West
Virginia has never had a religious or philosophical exemption. In Mississippi, the state supreme court
struck down a religious exemption on the ground that it violated the equal protection clause of the state
constitution in Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979). California repealed its religious exemption
following the Disneyland outbreak. See supra notes 97–103. New York and Maine repealed their
exemptions in 2019. An Act To Protect Maine Children and Students from Preventable Diseases
by Repealing Certain Exemptions from the Laws Governing Immunization Requirements, ch. 154, 2019
Me. Laws; An Act to Repeal Subdivision 9 of Section 2164 of the Public Health Law, Relating to
Exemption from Vaccination Due to Religious Beliefs, 2019 Sess. Law News of N.Y. Ch. 35 (A. 2371A) (McKinney’s).
237. GOSTIN, supra note 109, at 380, 654 n.54; see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATES WITH RELIGIOUS AND PHILOSOPHICAL EXEMPTIONS FROM SCHOOL
IMMUNIZATION REQUIREMENTS (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/schoolimmunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx.
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consensus concerning the safety or efficacy of vaccines.
Courts have generally upheld statutory religious and philosophical
exemptions as constitutional, subject to some caveats. Most notably,
several courts have overturned requirements that religious objectors be
members of an organized religious group, or that opposition to
immunization be a part of the objector’s church’s official doctrine.238 In
McCarthy v. Boozman,239 for example, the district court invalidated
Arkansas’s religious exemption, which allowed exemption only to
individuals whose objections were grounded in “the religious tenets and
practices of a recognized church or religious denomination of which the
parent . . . is an adherent or member.”240 The court held that the statutory
religious exemption violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
of the First Amendment as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment insofar as it “benefit[ted] only those who are
members or adherents of a church or religious denomination recognized
by the State.”241 Similarly, courts have ruled that states may, but need not,
require that a religious belief be sincerely held in order to qualify for the
exemption; where the statute does not impose a sincerity requirement,
some courts have held that state authorities may not inquire into the
sincerity of the objector’s asserted religious belief.242
238. See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81
(E.D.N.Y. 1987) (pantheistic objector entitled to religious exemption); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass.
753 (1971); Davis v. Maryland, 294 Md. 370 (1982) (requirement of membership in recognized religion
violated Establishment Clause); Kolbeck v. Kramer, 84 N.J. Super. 569 (1964); Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc.
2d 241 (N.Y. Sup. 1972) (membership in a recognized group not required).
239. 212 F. Supp. 2d 945 (W.D. Ark. 2002).
240. Id. at 947 (quoting ARK. CODE § 6-18-702(d)(2)).
241. Id.
242. Compare NM v. Hebrew Acad. Long Beach, 155 F. Supp. 3d 247, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)
(religious exemption unavailable where mother’s antivaccinationist beliefs “were formed with a primary
view toward the children's health, and not their religion”); Friedman v. Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 75
F. App’x 815 (2d Cir. 2003) (mother failed to demonstrate sincerity of religious objection); Turner v.
Liverpool Cent. School 186 F. Supp. 2d 187 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (no exemption where mother’s religious
belief was not sincere); Maier v. Besser, 73 Misc. 2d 241 (N.Y. Sup. 1972) (religious exemption applies
for sincerely held belief) with LePage v. Dep’t of Health, 18 P.3d 1177 (Wy. 2001) (Department of Health
exceeded its statutory authority by inquiring into sincerity of mother’s religious beliefs). Similarly, in
Fallon v. Mercy Catholic Med. Ctr. of Se. Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit held that an employer’s
vaccination mandate for health care workers did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s
provisions on religious discrimination where the plaintiff’s objection was grounded in the belief that “one
should not harm their own body and… that the flu vaccine may do more harm than good.” 877 F.3d 487,
492 (3d Cir. 2017); see also Prewitt v. Walgreens Co., No. CIV.A. 11-02393, 2012 WL 4364660, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2012) (no Title VII violation where “[p]laintiff advised Walgreens’ management that
he was opposed to administering flu vaccination shots… because he had a very close friend who died
from Guillain–Barre Syndrome from a flu vaccine”). At least one court, and the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, however, have found termination for failure to comply with a
workplace vaccination mandate to raise a triable issue of religious discrimination under Title VII. See
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Mission Hosp., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-00118-MOC-DLH, 2017
WL 3392783, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 7, 2017).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

55

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5

224

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88

Courts have played a secondary but essential role in maintaining this
line between normative and epistemic pluralism in legal exemptions to
vaccination policy by enforcing statutory requirements that an objection
be grounded in normative opposition to vaccination rather than empirical
doubts about the procedure’s safety or efficacy.243 In Galinsky v. Board
of Education of New York, for example, the Second Circuit affirmed the
denial of a religious exemption based on the district court’s determination
that the parents’ “opposition to immunization is not motivated by
religious beliefs, but rather, by plaintiffs’ personal fears for their
daughters’ well-being.”244 In so doing, courts have reinforced the
normative/epistemic divide in the structure of statutory exemptions and
further entrenched the law’s tacit commitment to accommodation of
objections to generally applicable legal requirements grounded in
normative principle and concomitant lack of accommodation to
objections grounded in epistemic pluralism.
IV. RATIONALIZING THE NORMATIVE/EPISTEMIC DIVIDE IN LAW AND
THEORY: TOWARD A PRINCIPLE OF EPISTEMIC PUBLIC REASON
If Rawls is correct that the coercive imposition of comprehensive
viewpoints upon reasonable dissenters constitutes a violation of the duty
of reciprocity and undermines the democratic legitimacy of state policy,
then we may ask whether the same problem arises when the state imposes
policies grounded in the empirical views of the majority. Liberal society
is characterized by widespread popular disagreement concerning
questions of empirical fact, and epistemic pluralism is driven by the same
freedom of conscience and free institutions that Rawls identified as a
source of persistent normative pluralism.245 Rawls’s omission of
epistemic pluralism is therefore a curious oversight.
The state of the law concerning mandatory vaccination places this
problem in a concrete context: does empirical disagreement regarding the
safety and efficacy of vaccinations challenge the legitimacy of state
policies requiring immunization? Can a meaningful distinction be drawn
between the imposition upon a dissenting citizen of policies grounded in
normative commitments that the citizen rejects and the same imposition
243. See, e.g., Mason v. General Brown Cent. School Dist. 851 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (parents’
belief that immunization was contrary to “genetic blueprint” was not religious belief for purposes of
religious exemption); Farina v. Board of Educ. of City of New York, 116 F. Supp. 2d 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(religious exemption does not apply to moral, scientific, or philosophical objections); Berg v. Glen Cove
City School Dist., 853 F. Supp. 651 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that medical, scientific, or philosophical
objections are insufficient); In re Christine M., 157 Misc. 2d 4 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992) (objections grounded
in scientific or medical doubt do not qualify for religious exemption).
244. Galinsky v. Bd. of Educ. of New York, 213 F.3d 636, 2000 WL 562423 (2d. Cir. 2000) (Table).
245. See supra Part I(B)(2).
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grounded in empirical conclusions that the citizen may deny with equal
vehemence? Why, in other words, does the state exceed the scope of
democratic legitimacy in, for example, forbidding access to abortion
because the Christian majority deems it sinful, but not in requiring
citizens to expose their children to a medical procedure that they sincerely
believe poses unwarranted health risks? This section will develop a
principle of epistemic public reason. It will examine both the content of
an epistemic overlapping consensus and identify a criterion by which
unreasonable epistemic viewpoints—at least those concerning a specific
type of empirical question classified as “scientific”—can be identified.
Rationalizing the distinction between moral and epistemic pluralism on
which the vaccination exemption scheme rests requires adapting Rawls’s
account of public reason to the context of epistemic pluralism. This
requires particular attention to Rawls’s distinction between reasonable
comprehensive views, which collectively comprise the overlapping
consensus, and unreasonable views, which exist outside the overlapping
consensus and thus beyond the scope of the duties of reciprocity and
civility.246 Rawls’s concept of reasonableness has been criticized as both
circular and arbitrary,247 but it has at least the virtue of establishing a line
beyond which the existence of normative pluralism ceases to present a
problem of legitimacy. Under Rawls’s theory, the state need not concern
itself with the full range of normative pluralism, but only with pluralism
among groups whose fundamental moral commitments are compatible
with the state’s own.
Two aspects of Rawls’s criterion of reasonableness are of particular
salience. First, it is explicitly constructivist, in that it defines the
“reasonable” comprehensive view not in terms of moral truth, but rather
in terms of its compatibility with the values of the overlapping
consensus.248 Indeed, Rawls maintains that political constructivism does

246. In defending his view that public policies should be grounded in public reason, Rawls concedes
that “[t]hose who reject constitutional democracy… will of course reject the very idea of public reason,”
but quickly dismisses this objection, noting that “[p]olitical liberalism does not engage those who think
this way.” Rawls, supra note 14, at 574.
247. See, e.g., Marilyn Friedman, John Rawls and the Political Coercion of Unreasonable People,
in THE IDEA OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON RAWLS 16 (Victoria Davion & Clark Wolf eds. 1999);
Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, Rawls and Communitarianism, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
RAWLS 483 (Samuel Richard Freeman ed. 1997) (“By defining ‘the reasonable’ as including a
commitment to a politically liberal vision of society, Rawls defines anyone who queries or rejects that
vision as ‘unreasonable’, but he offers no independent reason for accepting that morally driven and
question-begging definition.”).
248. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 90 (“The reason that [a constructivist political conception] may be the
focus of an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines is that it develops the principles of justice
from public and shared ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation and of citizens as free and equal
by using the principles of their common practical reason.”).
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not rely on a notion of truth at all.249 We are the tribe of the Liberal
Democrats, he argues, and our political values and traditions have value
not because they are true, but because they are ours. Second, at the same
time, Rawls’s conception of reasonableness is fundamentally normative;
it is a criterion of demarcation by which to identify which comprehensive
viewpoints are morally entitled to reciprocity and civility. Even if that
criterion of demarcation asserts constructivism rather than truth as
justification, it nevertheless carries an implicit ought—as any normative
criterion must.250
A viable principle of epistemic reasonableness cannot perform an
analogous function in the context of epistemic pluralism if excised from
its normative component. It must define the reasonable as encompassing
a set of epistemological methodologies identified not for their veridical
tendencies, but rather by virtue of their compatibility with an overlapping
social consensus concerning the construction of cognizable knowledge. It
also must account for the fact that the epistemically unreasonable act
wrongly—and thus forfeit any claim to reciprocity—in forming their
empirical beliefs. Thus, a principle of epistemic public reason must draw
upon concepts of virtue epistemology, including the central undertaking
of that field to “extend the range of moral concepts to include the
normative dimension of cognitive activity.”251
As in the case of normative views, the comprehensive epistemological
viewpoints—holistic methodologies for the construction of empirical
knowledge—by which individuals form empirical beliefs can be
distinguished from an overlapping consensus of reasonable
epistemological views—the set of epistemic principles that have been
recognized as legitimate by broad consensus in liberal society. For
example, comprehensive epistemological methodologies rely on such
sources of empirical knowledge, among others, as local or cultural
tradition, religious or other received dogma, faith (in a broader, not
249. Id. at 93 (“[W]ithin itself the political conception does without the concept of truth…. [I]t is
up to each comprehensive doctrine to say how its idea of the reasonable connects with its concept of truth,
should it have one.”); Jody S. Kraus, Political Liberalism and Truth, 5 LEG. THEORY 45, 53 (1999)
(“[W]hile mathematical constructivism [denies] that there is a mind-independent mathematical reality,
political constructivism refuses to affirm or deny a mind-independent moral reality.”).
250. In distinguishing the overlapping consensus from “mere” modus vivendi, Rawls explains that:
the object of consensus, the political conception of justice, is itself a moral conception…. [I]t is
affirmed on moral grounds, that is, it includes conceptions of society and of citizens as persons,
as well as principles of justice…. The fact that people affirm the same political conception on [the
grounds of their individual comprehensive viewpoints] does not make their affirming it any less
religious, philosophical, or moral… since the grounds sincerely held determined the nature of their
affirmation.
RAWLS, supra note 7, at 147.
251. LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI, VIRTUES OF THE MIND: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF
VIRTUE AND THE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE xv (1996).
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specifically religious sense of axiomatic belief), personal experience, or
anecdote. These are at times legitimate and even necessary methods of
belief formation—knowledge transmitted by folk wisdom or superstition
may well contain valuable truths, and ultimately all knowledge must be
acquired through personal experience of a sort, notwithstanding the
substantial limitations on the individual perspective.252 The
epistemological background culture involves competition among
comprehensive epistemological views for influence, with different
comprehensive methodologies offering distinct knowledge-constructive
methods.
In order to articulate a principle of epistemic public reason, we must
first identify a criterion, or set of criteria, by which the overlapping
consensus of reasonable epistemic pluralism is defined. Is there an
epistemic sine qua non, carrying both normative force and constructivist
legitimacy, by which epistemic methodologies that are entitled to
reciprocity may be distinguished from those that are not? This is a
multifaceted question. As in the case of normative pluralism, it is likely
that the outer bounds of epistemic reasonableness are to be defined by a
combination of epistemic virtues. But with respect to the type of empirical
question at issue here—the existence (or not) of regular, observable,
measurable associations between discrete classes of events, which I will
refer to as “scientific” questions—the reasonableness of an epistemic
viewpoint is to be measured by a single overriding criterion: the
compatibility of that viewpoint with the methods of scientific empiricism.
While acknowledging that a precise solution to the problem of
demarcation distinguishing “science” from non-science is a vexing one
that is beyond the scope of this Article, we may nevertheless see that the
scientific “method”—a catch-all term referring broadly to the
construction of knowledge via inductive inference from controlled
empirical observation, often involving experimentation, repetition, and a
system of institutionalized skepticism, conducted against a background
assumption of methodological naturalism253 has emerged as the dominant
process by which scientific knowledge has been constructed.254

252. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986); Hardwig, supra note 65.
253. See JUTTA SCHICKORE, ABOUT METHOD: EXPERIMENTERS, SNAKE VENOM, AND THE
HISTORY OF WRITING SCIENTIFICALLY 213–27 (2017); ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SCIENCE 270–78 (Norman W. Storer ed. 1973) (identifying “universalism, communism, disinterestedness,
and organized skepticism” as the “four sets of institutional imperatives... taken to comprise the ethos of
modern science”).
254. This is not to say that empiricism or rationalism have ever enjoyed unrivaled hegemony at any
moment in liberal intellectual history; that tradition has been challenged and subverted from within by
strains of antirationalist Romanticism. See generally DARRIN MCMAHON, ENEMIES OF THE
ENLIGHTENMENT (2001); Isaiah Berlin, The Counter-Enlightenment, in THE PROPER STUDY OF
MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF ESSAYS (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1997).
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Alternatives exist in the epistemic background culture—one could
envision consulting a Ouija board for cancer treatment, or accepting
insights into the nature of fundamental physics gained from a dream or
while under the influence of psychedelics. But just as in the case of those
whose comprehensive normative views are incompatible with the
commitments of the overlapping consensus, however, “[p]olitical
liberalism does not engage those who think this way.”255 Thus we reach
the first principle of epistemic reasonableness with respect to scientific
questions:
[1] An epistemic viewpoint is reasonable if and only if it accepts the
privileged status of scientific empiricism in the construction of knowledge
concerning scientific questions.

An epistemic viewpoint that rejects scientific empiricism is unreasonable
in the direct, or first-order, sense.
Identifying compatibility with scientific empiricism as the criterion of
reasonableness as to scientific questions does not get us very far. The
near-universality of consensus by which scientific empiricism is
recognized as the criterion of epistemic reasonableness also means that
most disputes about scientific questions at least rhetorically occur within
the paradigm of scientific empiricism rather than outside it. This is surely
true, at least in large part, in the case of antivaccinationism. While we
might characterize, for example, the claim that “mother’s intuition” is a
better method of constructing knowledge concerning complex questions
of causal relations between vaccination and health outcomes than peerreviewed medical research as epistemically unreasonable in the first-order
sense, antivaccinationists often adopt at least the rhetorical form of
scientific discourse. Thus, to say that recognition of the privileged status
of scientific empiricism in the construction of scientific knowledge
comprises the fundamental criterion of epistemic reasonableness with
respect to scientific questions is simply to raise the further question of
who is to decide, in the context of a specific dispute, what the prevailing
scientific conclusions on the matter are.256
As to this second-order question, we are compelled to rely on the
professional judgment of scientists in the field to identify the scope and
contours of expert consensus.257 Scientific laypersons, by definition, lack
255. Rawls, supra note 14, at 574.
256. Cf. David Winickoff, Epistemic Jurisdictions: Science and Courts in Regulatory
(De)centralization, in KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGY AND LAW, 175 (Emilie Cloatre & Martyn Pickersgill
eds., 2014) (defining “epistemic jurisdiction” as “the power to produce, interpret or warrant technical
knowledge for a given political community, topical arena, or geographical territory”).
257. To the extent this deference relies on a notion of truth, it is merely a second-order epistemic
authority of a practicing professional in matters concerning the substance of her vocation. The first-order
justification for scientific empiricism as the criterion of demarcation between reasonable and unreasonable
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access to the full body of information on which the expert consensus is
based and, as such, lack an epistemically valid basis on which to dispute
the content that consensus with members of the epistemic community of
experts.258 These observations suggest a measure of the scope of
reasonable epistemic pluralism: where the relevant experts lack a clear
consensus on a particular point, the room for reasonable disagreement is
comparatively broad, so long as the position is supported by good-faith
application of the methods of scientific empiricism.259 On the other hand,
where the relevant experts share a general consensus with respect to an
empirical question—whether the age of the Earth is closer to 4 billion or
10 thousand years, for example—that consensus constrains the scope of
epistemic reasonableness such that the views of epistemic dissenters may
legitimately be disregarded as unreasonable.260
This leads us to the second principle of epistemic reasonableness with
respect to scientific questions:
[2] An epistemic viewpoint satisfying principle (1) is reasonable if and only
if it accepts knowledge constructed by scientific empiricism as articulated
by the consensus of scientists with epistemic authority in the relevant
scientific domain.

An epistemic viewpoint that satisfies principle (1) but violates principle
(2) is epistemically unreasonable indirectly, or in the second-order. We
may observe that principles (1) and (2) reflect the distinction between
“non-science” and “pseudoscience,” respectively.
Having defined the principles of epistemic reasonableness, we can now
articulate a principle of epistemic public reason analogous to Rawls’s
epistemic pluralism in matters concerning scientific questions remains the constructivist rationale
discussed above.
258. See generally HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE (2007) (calling for
a “third wave” of science studies to reconcile the deconstructivist insights of postmodern critiques with
the existence of genuine epistemic authority); Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual
Due Process, 107 YALE L.J. 1535 (1997) (discussing the problem of “epistemic competence” in judicial
engagement with scientific expertise).
259. This approach is complicated by the fact that, unlike normative viewpoints, empirical views
formed via the inductive method of scientific empiricism are necessarily probabilistic; thus, the state must
respond to the risk of a range of empirical outcomes on the basis of necessarily imperfect and incomplete
information. How it does so—the degree of risk-aversion that the state’s policymaking apparatus adopts
and the probability threshold at which risk is considered actionable—are political questions with
inextricably normative components. I leave the “mixed” question of how the state should address
pluralism in risk tolerance to future work, since the relative risks involved in vaccination and the level of
certainty around the medical consensus is quite high in comparison to many other politically controversial
manifestations of epistemic pluralism.
260. Of course, who the relevant experts are and how much agreement establishes a “consensus”
are sometimes difficult questions in themselves. See James R. Dillon, Expertise on Trial, 19 COLUM. SCI.
& TECH. L. REV. 247, 260–61 (2018) (discussing the problems of defining the relevant epistemic
community and the threshold for consensus in the context of the legal standard for the admissibility of
expert witness testimony under U.S. v. Frye, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
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principle of normative public reason. The ideal of epistemic public reason
is realized whenever citizens and public officials act from and advocate
for public policies grounded in what they believe to be the most
reasonable application of scientific empiricism to scientific questions of
public significance.261 In so doing, the principle of reciprocity is respected
because all reasonable members of the political community, including
dissenters, can accept the epistemic methods by which policy-relevant
scientific facts were determined as reasonable, even if they disagree with
the ultimate conclusions. But the duty of reciprocity only extends as far
as the epistemic overlapping consensus—that is, to persons who accept
the principles of epistemic reasonableness. Beyond that point—with
respect to agents whose empirical beliefs on some policy-relevant
scientific question were formed by non-scientific or pseudoscientific
methods—the state and its officials are under no obligation to provide
reasons acceptable to the epistemic outlier.
Applying the principle of epistemic public reason, the legitimacy
question as applied to mandatory vaccination policies is rather simple
given the overwhelming weight of scientific consensus supporting the
(relative) safety and efficacy of vaccination. For over two hundred years,
medical experts have shared a broad consensus regarding the safety and
efficacy of vaccination as a preventative intervention. That consensus has
grown even stronger in the years following publication of the Wakefield
Study, as repeated studies have debunked any causal relationship between
childhood vaccination and the development of autism. Thus, reasons for
mandatory vaccination policies grounded in the established safety and
efficacy of vaccination are epistemic public reasons and can be accepted
by all epistemically reasonable citizens. This includes epistemically
reasonable vaccine skeptics—those who accept the principles of
epistemic reasonableness yet nevertheless doubt the specific empirical
conclusions on which policies of mandatory vaccination are grounded.262
Most empirical antivaccinationist arguments are not epistemically
reasonable.263 Such arguments have come in two broad forms: claims
concerning the superiority of alternative epistemological methods, such
as maternal intuition, to discovering empirical truths about vaccine safety;
261. Cf. Rawls, supra note 14, at 576.
262. Kirkland discusses a small group of epistemically reasonable vaccine skeptics—scientists at
mainstream institutions who were proponents of a causal link between mercury exposure and the
development of autism, but were unwilling to go beyond the scientific evidence. KIRKLAND, supra note
86 at 186–87. Such individuals, by definition, can accept the reasons grounded in the scientific consensus
even when they disagree with the state’s conclusions.
263. Not all antivaccinationist arguments are empirical, though as noted above, professed religious
or philosophical objections at least sometimes cover legally unpalatable empirical objections to
vaccination. See supra Part II(C)(1). Genuine religious or philosophical objections fall within the realm
of normative pluralism and as such are beyond the scope of this Article.
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and arguments purporting to apply the methods of scientific empiricism
while rejecting the content of the mainstream scientific consensus. The
first form is epistemically unreasonable in the direct or first-order insofar
as it rejects the privileged position of scientific empiricism in the
construction of scientific knowledge. The second form is epistemically
unreasonable indirectly, or in the second-order, insofar as it adheres to the
form of scientific empiricism but implicitly rejects that methodology by
rejecting the scientific consensus regarding the safety and efficacy of
vaccination. It is, in other words, pseudoscientific.264 Thus, empirical
objections to vaccination mandates grounded in claims that vaccines are
unsafe or ineffective are epistemically unreasonable, and the state may
disregard them in establishing public policy.
V. CONCLUSION: EPISTEMIC PUBLIC REASON AS A RATIONALIZING LEGAL
PRINCIPLE
The aim of this Article has been twofold: first, to focus attention on the
distinct sphere of epistemic pluralism as an omission from Rawls’s
account of “reasonable” pluralism; and second, to assess whether the
inevitable fact of epistemic pluralism in a liberal society characterized by
free institutions creates the same challenges for the legitimacy of the
democratic state as does normative pluralism, and if so, whether it is
amenable to a solution analogous to that of Rawls’s principle of public
reason. The examination of legal challenges to mandatory vaccination
requirements provides a useful perspective on these questions for several
reasons. First, the question of the safety or efficacy of vaccines is one on
which the epistemic battle lines have been, subject to minor variations
with the changing times, relatively stable for two centuries. During that
time, the pro-vaccination side has enjoyed the support of the mainstream
medical community as well as the imprimatur of the state in the form of
recommended or, frequently, mandatory vaccination requirements. The
medical establishment and state authorities have enjoyed almost complete
deference from the courts, which have uniformly upheld the imposition
of vaccination requirements as a legitimate exercise of states’ police
power and have rejected any claims to constitutional exemption from
vaccination requirements on the grounds of religious freedom or
otherwise. Yet the epistemic dissensus has persisted in the face of such
opposition, at times attracting a substantial minority of public sentiment
and occasionally erupting into civil disobedience or even violent
opposition to state-mandated immunization policies.
264. See, e.g., KIRKLAND, supra note 86 at 193 (noting that the petitioners’ evidence in the OAP
“came to be seen as scientifically suspect because it did not hold itself out for the kind of scrutiny that
characterizes the most prestigious science: testing and retesting, transparency, and replication”).
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My goal in conclusion is to consider the implications of the principle
of epistemic public reason on other legal discussions. Perhaps most
obviously, epistemic public reason provides a principled basis to
distinguish normative from epistemic pluralism in applications of the
First Amendment’s religion clauses, either in lawsuits seeking
accommodations for religious belief under the Free Exercise Clause or
those challenging some state policy under the Establishment Clause. It
could, for example, serve to rationalize the holdings in Epperson v.
Arkansas,265 Edwards v. Aguillard,266 Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School
District,267 and similar cases in which the courts have invalidated statutes
prohibiting the teaching of biological evolution via natural selection in
public classrooms or requiring or permitting teaching the theory of
creationism/“intelligent design”268 alongside evolution. Similar to
Stephen Jay Gould’s concept of “non-overlapping magisteria,”269 the
principle of epistemic public reason would support a constitutional
principle of deference to scientific expertise on empirical matters such as
the evolution of life and the age of Earth; in such matters, demands of
religious objectors to accommodation in the name of pluralism would be
unjustified and therefore could legitimately be denied without violating
the principle of religious tolerance. At the same time, matters pertaining
to normative rather than epistemic pluralism—for example, whether
religious institutions must comply with state anti-discrimination laws in
hiring support staff270—might be subjected to a “reasonableness” test
under the Free Exercise Clause to determine whether such principles are
broadly consistent with the fundamental normative commitments of the
265. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
266. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
267. 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
268. Kitzmiller held on the basis of substantial evidence introduced at trial that “Intelligent Design”
theory is “nothing less than the progeny of creationism.” Id. at 721.
269. STEPHEN JAY GOULD, ROCKS OF AGES: SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN THE FULLNESS OF LIFE 65
(1999). Gould’s conceptual framework has been criticized for its failure to acknowledge that religious
claims often include empirical assertions; creationism is a classic example of a religious claim with a
predominantly empirical component. The principle of epistemic public reason avoids that criticism by
distinguishing between propositions that are primarily normative and those that are primarily empirical,
regardless of whether the proposition can be classified as “religious.”
270. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 705
(2012) (citing Natal v. Christian and Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989);
Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 204–09 (2d Cir. 2008); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294,
303–07 (3d Cir. 2006); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800–01 (4th Cir. 2000); Combs
v. Central Tex. Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 345–50 (5th Cir. 1999); Hollins v. Methodist
Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225–27 (6th Cir. 2007); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475
(7th Cir. 2008); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1991);
Werft v. Desert Southwest Annual Conf., 377 F.3d 1099, 1100–04 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal
Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655–57 (10th Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church,
Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301–04 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 460–63 (D.C. Cir.
1996)).
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overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive viewpoints; if so,
accommodation should generally be granted.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc.271 illustrates the doctrinal confusion introduced by the failure to
recognize the distinction between normative and epistemic public reason.
In that case, the Court held that closely held for-profit corporations may
be entitled to an exemption under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993272 from compliance with the regulations promulgated under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010273 that would require
them to provide their employees with health insurance covering access to
“abortifacient” technologies where the provision of such technologies
violated the corporations’ religious objections to abortion.274 The
technologies to which the respondents objected included “two forms of
emergency contraception commonly called ‘morning after’ pills and two
forms of intrauterine devices [IUDs].”275 The Court stated that these
technologies “may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg
from developing any further by inhibiting its attachment to the uterus,”276
and because the Hobby Lobby respondents held a “sincere Christian belief
that life begins at conception,” they deemed this prevention of
implantation to be a form of abortion.277 In fact, however, this account of
the technologies’ function departs in two ways from the mainstream
medical community’s current understanding. First, the medical
community defines pregnancy as commencing with the implantation of a
fertilized egg in the uterus, not the moment of fertilization.278 Even if the
technologies at issue operate to prevent the implantation of a fertilized
egg as the Hobby Lobby respondents believed, they still would not
terminate a “pregnancy” and thus would be properly labeled
contraceptives rather than abortifacients. Second, and more
fundamentally, the Court’s (and Hobby Lobby’s) account of how the
contraceptive devices at issue function is likely factually incorrect.
Although there is, as evidenced by the Court’s use of the word “may,”
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

574 U.S. 682 (2014).
Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 1, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.).
Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1, 124 Stat. 119.
574 U.S. at 687.
Id. at 692–93.
Id. at 697–98.
Id. at 683.
See, e.g., AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, FACTS ARE
IMPORTANT: EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION (EC) AND INTRAUTERINE DEVICES (IUDS) ARE NOT
ABORTIFACIENTS (2014) (pregnancy “[i]s established only at the conclusion of implantation of a fertilized
egg”),
available
at
http://www.acog.org/-/media/Departments/Government-Relations-andOutreach/FactsAreImportantEC.pdf. The law also conceives of pregnancy as commencing at
implantation rather than fertilization. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) (“Pregnancy encompasses the period
of time from implantation until delivery.”).
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some uncertainty on the matter, the most current understanding holds that
these devices do not prevent the implantation of a fertilized egg, but
either, in the case of the morning after pills, inhibit ovulation, or, in the
case of IUDs, prevent sperm from reaching the egg.279 In light of current
medical understanding, therefore, the Hobby Lobby respondents were
simply incorrect in their belief that the contraceptive technologies at issue
cause the “death” of a fertilized egg.
The Hobby Lobby majority’s opinion glossed over the respondents’
factual errors by characterizing their objection as a “religious” one and
thus entitled to accommodation under RFRA. The Court wrote that “[t]he
[respondents] believe that providing the coverage demanded by the HHS
regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is
sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the coverage,” and
criticized the HHS and the principal dissent for purporting to tell the
respondents that their beliefs concerning this “religious and philosophical
question . . . are flawed.”280
By conflating the epistemic issues with the normative one, the Court in
Hobby Lobby ignored the distinction between normative and epistemic
pluralism. By the Court’s logic, antivaccinationists’ opposition to
mandatory vaccination policies could easily be recast as a “religious”
objection to injecting children with a substance that “may” cause autism.
Should the mainstream medical community respond that the best
available evidence strongly indicates that vaccines do not cause autism,
the Hobby Lobby Court would contend that “the federal courts have no
business addressing whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case
279. See Brief of Amici Curiae Physicians for Reproductive Health, American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American Society for Emergency Contraception, Association of
Reproductive Health Professionals, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Society for Adolescent
Health and Medicine, American Medical Women's Association, National Association of Nurse
Practitioners in Women's Health, Society of Family Planning, International Association of Forensic
Nurses, American College of Nurse-Midwives, James Trussell, Susan F. Wood, Don Downing And
Kathleen Besinque in Support of Petitioners, Sebilius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354, 2013 WL
5740263, at *17–19 (Oct. 21, 2013) [hereinafter PRH Amicus]; see also Brief of Amici Curiae American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Physicians for Reproductive Health, American Academy of
Pediatrics, American Nurses Association, et al. in Support of the Government, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., Nos. 13-354, 13-356, 2014 WL 333893, at *25 n.5 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2014) (“None of the FDAapproved emergency contraceptives or IUDs cause abortion; rather, they prevent unintended pregnancy
from occurring and thereby prevent situations in which a woman may consider abortion.”). The PRH
Amicus explains that “[t]here is no scientific evidence showing that either [of the two ‘morning after pills’
at issue] are able to prevent implantation of a fertilized egg.” 2013 WL 5740263,at *17; see id. at *16
(noting that earlier indications that the morning after pill “may inhibit implantation (by altering the
endometrium)… does not reflect the most current research” (emphasis omitted)). Rather, both pills likely
function by “preventing or disrupting ovulation.” Id. at *15–16. The same is true for the two types of IUD
to which the Hobby Lobby respondents objected. The hormonal IUD “works primarily by thickening the
cervical mucus, thereby preventing sperm from reaching the egg.” Id. at *18 (citing studies). The copper
IUD “affects the motility and viability of sperm and impairs their fertilizing capability.” Id. at *19.
280. 573 U.S. at 724.
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is reasonable.”281 Lest the principle of normative deference under RFRA
and the Establishment Clause collapse into one of epistemic nihilism by
which rational governance is impossible, it is essential to maintain the
distinction between empirical and normative questions in addressing
claims to religious accommodation. The law, for the most part, has
maintained that distinction in most contexts, including in response to legal
challenges to mandatory vaccination policies; the Hobby Lobby Court’s
failure to do so highlights the need for a more explicit articulation of the
distinct criteria by which the principles of normative and epistemic public
reason define reasonableness.
In sum, an examination of epistemic pluralism from a Rawlsian
perspective reveals a glaring omission from Rawls’s account of
“reasonable” pluralism, an omission that suggests an overlooked
challenge to the legitimacy of state policymaking. This Article represents
a first effort at defining a principle of epistemic public reason that
acknowledges entrenched disagreement around matters of empirical fact
arising from the burdens of empirical judgment and operation of free
institutions in a liberal society, and attempts to resolve legitimacy
concerns arising from the state’s imposition of policies grounded in
contested empirical views by defining the scope of an overlapping
consensus of reasonable epistemic views. The principle of epistemic
public reason articulated herein no doubt will require further elaboration
and refinement, but in this era of “fake news” and fraying public trust in
the epistemic authority of gatekeeping institutions such as the mainstream
press and the scientific establishment, it is essential to address more
clearly the problem of state policymaking in a society characterized by
deepening rifts in our shared conception of reality.
VI. POST SCRIPT: A NOTE OF CAUTION
This is an Article about law, and thus about violence and coercion.282
My thesis has been that the phenomenon of epistemic pluralism—
entrenched disagreement about matters of empirical fact—poses similar
problems of legitimacy under a Rawlsian analysis as does the
phenomenon of normative pluralism, and that the principle of epistemic
public reason defines the distinction between reasonable and
unreasonable epistemic viewpoints. Empirical antivaccinationist
arguments are epistemically unreasonable; thus, the state is free to apply
the coercive force of law to impose vaccination policies grounded in the
consensus of mainstream medical science. In the case of vaccine refusal,
281. Id. (parentheses omitted).
282. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1985) (“Legal interpretation
takes place on a field of pain and death.”).
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there may be good reasons to apply that force. Antivaccinationists expose
their own children, the children of others, and the community at large to
serious risks of vaccine-preventable disease. Centuries of experience with
vaccination have shown the procedure to be an extraordinarily effective
means of controlling the spread of disease, and the medical community
has long since resolved any reasonable doubts concerning vaccines’
safety relative to the medical benefits the procedure creates. The benefits
of imposing a vaccination requirement with only a narrow medical
exception would thus appear to easily outweigh the harm of compelling
parents against their will to submit their children to a beneficial medical
procedure.
Nevertheless, I end on a note of caution. Before advocating a policy of
legal coercion—however legitimate that policy may be from Rawls’s
rather abstract perspective—it is wise to consider the practical effects of
that policy. Who, demographically speaking, are the unvaccinated, and
what consequences might a more rigid immunization policy produce?
Empirical studies show a division between the “non-vaccinated,” whose
mothers reject vaccination entirely on ideological grounds, and the
“under-vaccinated,” who have received some but not all recommended
immunizations.283 Under-vaccinated children are more likely to be
African American, to live in a central city, and to have a mother who is
young, unmarried, lacks a college degree, and has an annual household
income at or near the poverty line.284 In contrast, mothers of the nonvaccinated are more likely to be white, married, college-educated, and
with an annual household income over $75,000.285 Under-vaccination is,
at least to a considerable degree, a problem of inaccessible health care
infrastructure rather than ideological opposition.286
The affluent non-vaccinated—the true antivaccinationists—are
motivated by a different set of concerns. Jennifer Reich’s study of mostly
white, affluent mothers who reject the recommended vaccination
schedule found three broad areas of shared belief: (1) that the mothers
themselves are more capable of assessing the risks and benefits of

283. See Jennifer A. Reich, Neoliberal Mothering and Vaccine Refusal: Imagined Gated
Communities and the Privilege of Choice, 20 GEND. & SOC. 1 (2014); Philip J. Smith, Susan Y. Chu &
Lawrence E. Barker, Children Who Have Received No Vaccines: Who Are They and Where Do They
Live?, 114 PEDIATRICS 187 (2004). I use the word “mothers” advisedly, as these studies indicate that
decisions concerning childhood health care are predominantly the province of the female parent. Reich,
20 GEND. & SOC. at 7; ALINA SALGANICOFF, USHA R. RANJI & ROBERTA WYN, WOMEN AND HEALTH
CARE: A NATIONAL PROFILE 40 (2005).
284. Reich, supra note 165, at 2; Smith, Chu, and Barker, supra note 284, at 187.
285. Reich, supra note 165, at 2; Smith, Chu, and Barker, supra note 284, at 187.
286. See, e.g., Lauren M. Whaley, Majority at Some LAUSD Kindergartens are Under-Vaccinated,
L.A. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.dailynews.com/health/20150130/majority-at-some-lausdkindergartens-are-under-vaccinated.
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vaccines than experts such as medical professionals and state agencies;287
(2) that alternative resource- and time-intensive mothering practices,
particularly involving breastfeeding and “organic” diets, will maintain
their children’s health without the need for vaccination;288 and (3) that
risk of infection can be effectively managed through what Reich calls
“imagined gated communities”—careful and active management of their
children’s social networks to exclude perceived vectors of disease.289 One
might readily expect, then, that these mothers—ideologically opposed to
vaccination and with abundant time and resources to invest in the pursuit
of what they believe to be the best interests of their children—will find
more effective means of evasion than the mothers of under-vaccinated
children on whom the burden of punitive enforcement would fall most
heavily.290
This post-script should not be read as advocating against narrowing the
scope of vaccination exemptions, or in favor of accommodation of
epistemic outliers when public health is at stake. My purpose here is
simply to point out that the abstract question of legitimacy in the Rawlsian
sense does not fully exhaust the question of whether legal coercion in a
particular context is advisable, wise, or even intuitively “fair.” It is also
to remind us of the unintended consequences that can arise in the familiar
gap between “law on the books” and “law in action.”291 Where a coercive
vaccination policy is justified on the basis of the health benefits accruing
to the entire community from a vaccination rate sufficient to establish
herd immunity, it is imperative that we ensure compliance not only with
the threat of punitive sanctions, but also by providing resources sufficient
to enable meaningful access. As vaccination is a matter of communal
health, it is essential that the community take the necessary steps to ensure
that all members may avail themselves of its benefits.

287. This belief resembles the “mommy instinct” to which Jenny McCarthy refers in defense of her
own antivaccinationism. McCarthy, MOTHER WARRIORS, supra note 190, at 93; see also Emily Chivers
Yochim & Vesta T. Silva, Everyday Expertise, Autism, and “Good” Mothering in the Media Discourse
of Jenny McCarthy, 10 COMM. & CRITICAL/CULTURAL STUD. 406 (2013).
288. Yochim & Silva, supra note 288, at 14–16.
289. Id. at 17–20.
290. Reich notes that the affluent mothers of her study sample “feel entitled to address experts as
consultants and refuse their advice without fear of reprisal, choices less readily available to less privileged
families, whose rejection of expert advice more easily results in state intervention.” Reich, supra note
165, at 12. The current vaccination regime is, of course, neither the first nor the most brutal in its
application of coercive force to achieve compliance, particularly against the underprivileged. See Willrich,
supra note 116, at 77 (during smallpox outbreaks in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, “the
vaccinator’s lancet and the policeman’s club were fast friends”).
291. See Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 36 (1910).
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